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A RESUME OF DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE*
LEsTER

B. OpximDt

ARRAIGNMENT

A federal statute provides that when any person is indicted
for any capital offense, other than treason, a copy of the indictment must be delivered to him at least two days before the trial;
and in case of treason three days before the trial.' This provision is mandatory so that a failure to comply is prejudicial
error. 2 In 1927 this statute was amended to read:
"In each criminal case not provided for in Section 562 of
this title the clerk shall furnish each defendant upon his request,
a copy of the information filed or indictment returned against
him, the fees for said copy and the certificate thereto, at the
rates provided for by law to be taxed as costs; but such fees
shall not be demanded of any such defendant unless and until
by order, judgment, or decree of the court the costs in the case
are assessed against him." 3
In a case coming up from the District Court for Puerto
Rico the Supreme Court ruled that the provision of the Organic
Act of Puerto Rico of March 2, 1917,4 giving an accused a right
to a copy of the information, did not confer such right without
the payment of copying fees to the clerk, when the accused
waives the reading of the information and pleads not guilty. 5
In the absence of the latter element the Court felt he was
entitled to a copy, since there are two languages in Puerto Rico
* This paper is a portion of a book which is to appear shortly.

Other portions appear in the Nebraska Law Review for September,
1941, and March, 1942, and in the Rocky Mountain Law Review for
February,1942.
t Professor of Law, University of Nebraska; Member United
States Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
I Rev. Stat. 1033; 18 U. S. C. A., sec. 562. See Hughes, Federal
Practice,vol. 9 (1931), sec. 7085.
'Thiede v. Utah, (1895) 159 U. S.510, 40 L. Ed. 237, 16 Sup.
Ct. 62.
3 44 Stat. 1023; 18 U. S. Ct. 562(a).
"Chap. 145, 48 U. S. C. A., sec. 737.
'Segurola v. United States, (1927)

48 S.Ct. 77.

275 U.S. 106, 72 L. Ed. 186,
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and a somewhat new criminal procedure was being put in effect
there. 6 The Court stated that the Federal Constitution had no
similar provision.
In Johnson v. United States Mr. Justice MeKenna stated:
"There is no explicit provision in the laws of the United States
7
He pointed
describing what shall constitute an arraignment.''
out that in Crain v. United States" the arraignment was considered as distinct from the plea and consisted of formally calling the accused to the bar for the purpose of a trial. He also
pointed out that the word was used in the following federal
statute as comprehensively decriptive of what shall precede the
plea:
"When any person indicted for any offense against the
United States, whether capital or otherwise, upon his arraignment stands mute or refuses to plead or answer thereto, it shall
be the duty of the court to enter the plea of not guilty on his
behalf in the same manner as if he had not pleaded guilty thereto. And when the party pleads not guilty, or such plea is
entered as aforesaid, the cause shall be deemed at issue, and
9
shall, without further form or ceremony, be tried by a jury.''
In Crain v. United States the court held that there must be
0
a plea and arraignment before trial duly entered of record.'
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in that case was
later adopted as a correct statement of the law in a state court
case." The court expressly overruled the Crain Case, pointing
out by Mr. Justice Day that in earlier days an accused had had
but few rights in the presentation of his defense, he could not
be represented by counsel, could not be heard on his own oath,
and punishment of even trivial offenses was severe and shocking.
The record sufficiently shows that the indictment was read

'On that basis the court distinguished United States v. Van
Duzee, (1891) 140 U.S. 169, 172, 35 L.Ed. 399, 400, 11 S.Ct. 758,
which denied the right except in capital cases.
I Johnson v. United States, (1912) 225 U.S. 405, 56 L. Ed. 1142,
32 S. Ct. 748, 749. For a full discussion of arraigmnent with citation
of lower court cases see Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclopedia of Federal
Procedure, vol. 5 (1929), sections 2171-2183; see also Hughes, Federal Practice,vol. 9 (1931), sec. 7086.
"Crain v. United States, (1896) 162 U.S. 625, 40 L. Ed. 1097,
16 S. Ct. 952.
' 18 U. S. C. A., sec. 564.
"Crain v. United States, (1896) 162 U.S. 625, 40 L. Ed. 1097,
16 S. Ct. 952.
"Garland v. State of Washington, (1914) 232 U.S. 642, 58 L. Ed.
772, 34 S. Ct. 456.
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to the accused, assuming that information of the charge requires
a reading of the indictment, where, after reciting the presence
of the attorney for the United States, the defendant and the
defendant's attorney, it adds that "thereupon the defendant,
being arraigned upon the indictment, pleads thereto not guilty,
and for trial puts himself upon the country, and the attorney
of the United States doth the like. "12
Mr. Justice Harlan thus described the nature of the plea of
not guilty:
"The plea of not guilty is unlike a special plea in a civil
action, which, admitting the case averred, seeks to establish
substantive grounds of defense by a preponderance of evidence.
It is not in confession and avoidance, for it is a plea that controverts the existence of every fact essential to constitute the crime
charged. "13
Leave to an accused to file a special plea in bar after a plea
of not guilty has been entered should be denied where the
matters set forth therein are mere matters of defense determinable under the general issue. 14 A special plea in bar is appropriate where defendant pleads former acquittal, former conviction or pardon. 15
The defense of entrapment may be raised under a plea of
not guilty.16 The court may not itself grant immunity on the
basis of entrapment. The issue of entrapment to violate the
National Prohibition Act was for the jury. The defense is not
analogous to a plea of pardon or of autre fois conviction or
autre fois acquittal, since the two former assume guilt, while the
defense of entrapment is on the basis that the defendant is not
guilty. In net effect an exception is read into the statute when
the element of entrapment occurs. Justices Brandies, Stone and
'Johnson v. United States, (1912) 225 U.S. 405, 56 L.Ed. 1142,
32 S. Ct. 748.
1 Davis v. United States, (1895) 160 U. S. 469, 40 L. Ed. 499, 505,
16 S.Ct. 353, 357.
"United States v. Murdock, (1931) 284 U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63,
76 L. Ed. 210, 82 A. L. R. 1376.
'The court cited 2 Bishop, New Crim. Proc., 2 ed., sections 742,
797, 805 et seq.
I Sorrells v. United States, (1932) 287 U.S. 435, 77 L. Ed. 413,
53 S.Ct. 210, 86 A. L. R. 249. Brandeis, Stone and Roberts, J.J., filing

a separate opinion, and McReynolds, J., dissenting. See comments on

the case in 31 Mich. L. Rev. 1159; 17 Minn. L. Rev. 90, and 331; 41
YaleL.J. 1249; 42 YaleL.J. 803; 1 U. Chi.L.Rev. 115; 46 Harv.L.
Rev. 848; 11 Tex. L. Rev. 385; 23 J.Crim. L. 482. See Mikell,
Entrapment inthe FederalCourts, (1941) 90 U. Pa. L. Rev. -.
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Roberts objected to the latter as judicial amendment, and as giving no rule when an exception would be read into a given statute.
They instead would admit the guilt of 'the defendant and rest
the defense on the basis of public policy in protecting the purity
of the administration of justice. Under their view the court
may discharge the prisoner on a writ of habeas corpus, quash
the indictment, or entertain and try a plea in bar. In fact, the
power of the court goes further. At any stage of the case proof
of entrapment should require the court to stop the prosecution,
direct that the indictment be quashed, and the defendant set at
liberty. If in doubt as to the facts it might submit the issue of
entrapment to a jury simply for advice, which would not be
binding on it.
In one case an accused had been sentenced to imprisonment
in a prosecution for a misdemeanor, on his plea of guilty. Later
during the same term of court he was brought into court and the
judgment vacated, his plea of guilty withdrawn, and he was
allowed to plead anew. He gave bond and his case was continued. In an action on the bail-bond which he had forfeited,
the sureties raised the question of the right of the court to
vacate the former judgment, and the Court sustained the
right.1 7 Mr. Justice Miller stated:
". .. All this took place during the same term of the court,
and we see no reason to doubt that the court had power during
that term, for proper cause, to set aside the judgment rendered
on confession. This control of the court over its own judgment
during the term is of every-day practice."' 8
The court has power to accept a plea of guilty even in the
felony case.'19 On timely application the court will vacate a
plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained or given
through ignorance, fear, or inadvertence. 20
The Criminal Appeal Rules adopted by the Supreme Court
1'Bassett v. United States, (1869) 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 38, 19 L. Ed.
'Bassett v. United States, (1869) 9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 38, 41,
19 L. Ed. 548. The court cited Sun Cheong-Kee v. United States,
(1866) 3 Wall. 320, 18 L.Ed. 72; King v. Price, (1805) 6 East 323,
102 Eng. Rep. 1310.
" Hallinger v. Davis, (1892) 146 U.S. 314, 36 L. Ed. 986, 13 Sup.
Ct. 105. This was held as to a state court case.
" Kercheval v. United States, (1927) 274 U.S. 64, 71 L. Ed. 1009,
47 S.Ct. 582. Stone, J., concurred in the result. See (1931) 79
U. Pa. L. Rev. 484; (1941) 32 J.Crim. L. 199; (1941) 20 Neb. L. Rev.
173.
548.
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in 1934 deal with, the time of making and decision of a motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty and the effect of such a motion on the
time for sentencing. Under Rule II (4) :
"A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty shall be made within ten (10) days after entry of such plea and before sentence is
imposed."
Under Rule II (1) motions to withdraw plea of guilty are
to be determined promptly. Under Rule I sentences are to be
imposed "without delay" unless among other things a motion
for withdrawal of the plea of guilty is pending.
It should be noted that the statutes2 1 permitting the
Supreme Court to lay down rules for criminal appeal expressly
provide:
"That nothing herein contained shall be construed to give
the Supreme Court the power to abridge the right of the
accused to apply for withdrawal of a plea of guilty, if such
application be made within ten days after entry of such plea,
and before sentence is imposed."
A plea of nolo contendere is an admission of guilt for the
purpose of the case. The court is not, by merely accepting such
22
a plea, prevented from imposing a sentence of imprisonment.
The Prohibition Act of March 4, 1925 expressly recognized the
23
plea.
A plea of nolo contendere has all the effects of a plea of
guilty for the purposes of the case, although it does not create
an estoppel. 24 After such a plea is entered, a stipulation of
facts cannot import an issue as to the sufficiency of the indictment, or an issue of fact upon the question of guilt or innocence.
128 U. S. C. A., section 723a.

"Hudson v. United States, (1926) 272 U.S. 451, 71 L. Ed. 347

(good historical discussion by Stone, J.). See also Brewster on Federal Procedure (1940) 584.
' Chap. 521, 43 Stat. at L. 1259, Comp. Stat., sec. 10,564 4/5; 18
U. S. C. A., sec. 724.
S'U. S. v. Norris, (1930) 281 U.S. 619, 74 L.Ed. 1076 and note.
Defendant moved in arrest of judgment on the ground that on the
face of the record he was not guilty of the crime charged.
The court cited Hudson v. United States, (1926) 272 U.S. 451,
455, 71 L. Ed. 347, 349, 47 Sup. Ct. 127; United States v. Fair, (C. C. A.
8th, 1912) 115 C. C. A. 49, 195 Fed. 47, 52.
See also (1927), 36 YaleL.J. 421; (1932) 18 Va.L.Rev. 693;
(1932) 36 Dickinson L. Rev. 187; (1934) 12 N. Car. L. Rev. 369; (1934)
25 J. Crim. L. 637; (1935) 10 Wis. L. Rev. 384; (March, 1942) 21 Neb.
L. Rev. -;
5 Longsdorf and Nicholas, Cyc. o fFed. Proc., (1929), sections 2095-2101; Zoline, Fed. Crim. Law and Proc., sec. 222; 9 Hughes,

Fed. Practice,sec. 7089.
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After the plea nothing is left but to render judgment since no
issue of fact exists and none can be made while the plea remains
of record. All that is left is the question of punishment. As to
the issue of guilt or innocence the plea is as conclusive as a plea
of guilty. A plea of nolo contendere may be withdrawn by
leave of court and one of not guilty entered.
DouBLE JEOPARDY

A plea of double jeopardy is a plea in bar, like the plea of
pardon and of the statute of limitations. 25 It would therefore
be appropriate to deal with it under the heading of "Methods
of Attacking Indictments or Informations."
It is discussed
here separately because of the considerable number of Supreme
Court decisions on the subject.
Mr. Justice Holmes in interpreting the double jeopardy
provision of the Fifth Amendment stated in a dissenting
opinion:

"At the present time in this country there is more danger
that criminals will escape justice than that they will be
subjected to tyranny. But I do not stop to consider or state
the consequences in detail, as such considerations are not
supposed to be entertained by judges, except as inclining them
to one of two interpretations, or as a tacit last resort in case of
doubt. It is more pertinent to observe that logically and rationally a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in
the same cause, however often he may be tried." 26
Where a defendant is indicted for robbing the mails and
putting the life of the driver in danger, and the conviction and
judgment pronounced extended to both offenses, Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall ruled that no prosecution could be maintained
See Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure,
vol. 5, sections 2152-2157. For discussions of jeopardy see the American Law Institute, Administration of the Criminal Law, Double
Jeopardy, (1935); Kirk, Jeopardy During the Period of the Year
Books, (1934) 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 602, Comley, Former Jeopardy, (1926)
35 Yale L. J. 674; Comment (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 522; Rottschaefer
on ConstitutionalLaw, (1939) 812-817.
"Kepner v. United States, (1904) 195 U.S. 100, 49 L. Ed. 114,
24 S.Ct. 797, 806, 1 Ann. Cas. 655, White and McKenna, J. J., con-

curring in his dissent. For a case upholding prosecution appeals in

state court cases see Palko v. Connecticut, (1937) 302 U.S. 319, 82
L. Ed. 288, 58 Sp. Ct. 149, 113 A. L. R. 636, noted 37 Mich. L. Rev. 103;
47 Yale L.J. 489; 28 J. Crim. L. 919; 51 Harv. L. Rev. 739; 22 Minn.
L. Rev. 550, 86 U. Pa. L. Rev. -.
See also Orfield, Criminal Appeals
in America, (1929) 58-61.
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for the same offense, or for any part of it provided the former
conviction was pleaded. 27 The same rule governs the necessity
of a plea of jeopardy as governs a plea of pardon.
.r.
Justice Clifford elaborately discusses the method of
pleading a former conviction in his dissenting opinion in Coleman v. Tennessee.28 In general, the pleador should set forth
the former conviction and judgment verbatim, and then proceed
to allege: "As by the record thereof in the said court remaining
more fully and at large appears, which said judgment and conviction shall remain in full force and effect, and not in the least
reversed or made void." It must allege that the former trial
was in a court having jurisdiction of the case and must set
forth the substance of the record.
Pleas of former jeopardy and not guilty are not inconsistent, and may stand together, though the former must be disposed of first.29 Apparently the trial court could submit the plea
of jeopardy to the jury with instructions to find the issue for
the government.
A general verdict of acquittal upon the issue of not guilty
to an indictment undertaking to charge murder, and not
objected to before verdict as insufficient in that respect, is a bar
to a second indictment for the same killing.30 Of course the
court must have jurisdiction of the offense and the accused.
The verdict of acquittal need not have been followed by any
judgment.
In a state court case the court held that the contention that
a second conviction of a public officer for failing, on demand, to
pay over certain public moneys deprived him of his liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by twice subjecting him to jeopardy for the same offense,
presented no judicial question which would sustain a writ of
error, where the state court decided that the accused was not
I United States v. Wilson, "(1833) 7 Pet. (32 U.S.)

150, 160,

8 L. Ed. 640.
1 Coleman v. Tennessee, (1878) 97 U. S. 509, 520, 24 L. Ed. 1118.
See also Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure,
(1929) vol. 5, sec. 2155; Hughes, Federal Practice, vol. 9 (1931), sections 6532, 6901-6902.
' Thompson v. United States, (1894) 155 U.S. 271, 39 L. Ed. 146,
15 S. Ct. 73.
'Ball v. United States, (1896) 163 U.S. 662, 41 L. Ed. 300, 16
S. Ct. 1192. The court by Gray, J., reviewed the contrary English
cases, and the earlier American cases.

FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

put in jeopary by his prior conviction, because such conviction
was reversed on the ground that there had been no legal demand.
Mr. Justice Harlan stated:
"It is an established rule that one is not put in jeopardy if
the indictment under which he is tried is so radically defective
that it would not support a judgment of conviction, and that a
judgment thereon would be arrested on motion. So, where the
defense is that the accused was put in jeopardy for the same
offense by his trial under a former indictment, if it appears
from the record of that trial that the accused had not then or
previously committed, and could not possibly have committed,
any such crime as therein charged, and therefore that the court
was without jurisdiction to have rendered any valid judgment
against him,-and such is the case now befores us,-then the
accused was not, by such trial, put in jeopardy for the offense
specified in the last or new indictment.' 's
A judgment dismissing an indictment on the ground that
the offense charged is barred by the statute of limitations is a
bar, irrespective of any question of former jeopardy to a
second prosecution under a new indictment for the same
offense. 32 Likewise a judgment upon a demurrer would be a
bar to a second indictment in the same words. The quashing
of a bad indictment would not, however, bar a prosecution
upon a good one.
A plea of res judicata may be available in certain cases
where the plea of double jeopardy would not lie, where a final
judgment has been entered discharging a defendant who has not
been put in jeopardy.3 3 The same has been held where both a
criminal and a civil penalty are provided as punishments for
the same act and the issue has been finally determined by an
3 4
acquittal.
Shoener v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (1907) 207 U.S.

188, 195, 52 L. Ed. 163, 166, 28 S. Ct. 110, 113.

"United States v. Oppenheimer, (1916) 242 U.S. 85, 61 L. Ed.

161, 37 S. Ct. 68, 3 A.L.R. 516.
The court cited Frank v. Mangum, (1914) 237 U.S. 309, 334,
59 L. Ed. 969, 983, 35 S. Ct. 582; Coffey v. United States, (1886) 116

U.S. 436, 445, 29 L. Ed. 684, 687, 6 S. Ct. 437.
"United States v. Oppenheimer, (1916) 242 U.S. 85, 61 L. Ed.

161, 37 S. Ct. 68, 3 A.L.R. 516. See (1940) 24 Minn.L.Rev. 526,
558-561; Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure,
vol. 5, (1929), sec. 2112.
Coffey v. United States, (1886) 116 U.S. 436, 29 L. Ed. 684,

6 S.Ct. 437.
L. J.-3
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In a case coming up from the Philippine Islands the
Supreme Court held that where the accused was convicted of
assault and battery and subsequently the victim died, there was
35
no jeopardy so as to prevent a prosecution for homicide.
A person is not subjected to jeopardy merely by being
arrested, subjected to a preliminary examination, and being
thereupon discharged. 36 Even when there has been an indictment found, followed by arraignment, pleading thereto,
repeated continuances, and eventual dismissal at the instance
of the prosecuting officer on the ground of insufficient evidence
to hold the accused, it does not amount to jeopardy.sr
In an interstate rendition case the Supreme Court pointed
out that the mere arraignment and pleading to the indictment
by the accused do not put him in jeopardy. 38
It was perhaps implicit in an early case that discharging a
jury previously impaneled to certify a case up from the old
Circuit Court to the Supreme Court on division of opinion did
not constitute jeopardy since the Court would not pass on a
moot case.

39

Even
a verdict,
unable to
jeopardy.
"The

in a capital case the discharge of a jury from giving
without the consent of the accused, the jury being
agree, is not deemed to have put the accused in
Mr. Justice Story stated:
prisoner has not been convicted or acquitted, and may
again be put upon his defense. We think, that in all cases of
this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the
authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends
of public justice would otherwise be defeated. They are to
exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and it would be
'Diaz v. United States, (1912) 223 U.S. 442, 56 L.Ed. 500, 32
S. Ct. 250; Joseph R. Lamar, J., dissenting.
" Collins v. Loisel, (1923) 262 U.S. 426, 67 L. Ed. 1062, 43 S.Ct.
618 (international extradition). United States ex. rel. Rutz v. Levy,
(1925) 268 U. S. 390, 69 L. Ed. 1010, 45 S. Ct. 516; Note (1940) 24
M mn. L. Rev. 522, 524-527.
*'The court cited Bassing v. Cady, (1908) 208 U.S. 386, 391,
52 L. Ed. 540, 543, 28 S.Ct. 392, 13 Ann. Cas. 905. See Rottschaefer on
ConstitutionalLaw, (1939) 813.
"'Bassing v. Cady, (1908) 52 L Ed. 540, 28 S.Ct. 392, 393. The
court cited 1 Wharton, Criminal Law, sections 544, 590.
"United States v. Brewster, (1833) 7 Pet. (32 U. S.) 164, 165-166,
8. L. Ed. 645.
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impossible to define all the circumstances which would render
'
it proper to interfere. "40
There is no violation of the Fifth or Sixth Amendment
where an accused is tried by the same jury which had been dismissed after a demurrer to the indictment had been overruled.
The failure to impanel a new jury after the subsequent plea of
not guilty did not deprive the accused of his right to a jury
41
trial; nor did it constitute jeopardy.
Where the consolidation of fourteen indictments against
defendant
had been directed, the jury impaneled and sworn,
the
and the district attorney had made a statement of his case to
the jury, and the court then discharged the jury, and rescinded
its order of consolidation, and the accused was tried and found
guilty on one of those indictments, against his protest and without his consent, this seems not to have been regarded as
42
jeopardy.
There is no jeopardy shown where the jury was discharged
without the consent of the accused, by the court, on its own
motion, after the jury had deliberated forty hours and then
43
announced in open court that they could not agree.
In a state court case the Court ruled that a plea of former
jeopardy cannot be based upon the discharge of the jury for
their inability to agree upon a verdict after considering the
case from four o'clock in the afternoon until half-past nine in
44
the morning of the succeeding day.
There is no jeopardy where the jury is discharged after
the trial had begun, one witness having been examined, on the
ground of the discovery that one member of the petit jury was
disqualified since he had served on the grand jury which found
45
the indictment.
'United States v. Perez, (1824) 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 579, 580,
165. v. New Mexico, (1916) 2,42 U.S. 199, 61 L.Ed. 244,
6 L. 4Ed.
Lovato
37 S. Ct. 107; Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law, (1939) 787. The
court cited United States v. Perez, (1824) 9 Wheat. 579, 580, 6 L. Ed.
165, 166; Dreyer v. Illinois (1902) 187 U.S. 71, 85, 86, 47 L.Ed. 79,
86, 23 S. Ct. 28, 15 Am. Cr. Rep. 253.
"Ex parte Bigelow, (1885) 113 U.S. 328, 28 L. Ed. 1005, 5 S. Ct.
542.
'Logan v. United States, (1892) 144 U.S. 263, 36 L. Ed. 429,
12 S. Ct. 617, 628
"Dreyer v. ilinois, (1902) 187 U.S. 71, 47 L. Ed. 79, 23 S. Ct. 28,
32. The court cited the earlier federal court cases.
* Thompson v. United States, (1894) 155 U. S. 271, 39 L. Ed. 146,
15 S. Ct. 73. The court cited Logan v. United States, (1892) 144
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'Where, after evidence had been given on a trial for the
prosecution, an affidavit was produced, alleging that a juror on
his voir dire, falsely swore that he had no acquaintance with
the accused, and a letter commenting on the affidavit was
published in a newspaper and was read by members of the jury,
46
the court could dismiss the jury and allow a new trial.
When a person has been found guilty of murder in the
first degree with a mitigation of the penalty to life imprisonment in the verdict, he is not placed twice in jeopardy by an
unqualified conviction for murder in the first degree with a
penalty of death in a new trial upon a writ of error by the
47
accused.
A civil action to recover taxes, which in fact are penalties,
is punitive in character and barred by a prior conviction of the
defendant for a criminal offense involving the same transactions. 48 Distinguishable is the situation where the proceeding
49
is in one to forfeit property used in committng an offense.
The forfeiture is no part of the punishment for the criminal
offense, and the jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment does
not apply.50
The accused may plead former jeopardy where the evidence
necessary to ascertain the indictment at the second trial might
have been given by the prosecution as to the indictment in the
first trial.51 The accused has a good special plea.
The defendant does not make out a plea of former jeopardy
where it is shown that the offense for which he was formerly
acquitted was an entirely distinct offense. Thus where the first
U.S. 263, 12 S. Ct. 617; Simmons v. United States, (1891) 142 U.S.
148, 35 L.Ed. 968, 12 S. Ct. 171; United States v. Perez, (1824) 9
579, 6 L. Ed. 165.
Wheat.
'8 Simmons v. United States, (1891) 142 U.S. 148, 35 L. Ed. 968,
12 S. Ct. 171.
1Stroud v. United States, (1919) 251 U. S. 15, 64 L. Ed. 103,
40 S. Ct. 50; Trono v. United States, (1905) 199 U.S. 521, 50 L.Ed.
292, 26 S. Ct. 121, 4 Ann. Cas. 773. The jury was permitted to reduce
the penalty in capital cases to life imprisonment under section 330
of the Criminal Code, 35 Stat. at L. 1152, chap. 321, Comp. Stat., sec.
10,504.
'United States v. La Franca, (1931) 282 U.S. 568, 51 S. Ct. 278,
75 L. Ed. 551.
"Various items of Personal Property v. United States, (1931)
282 U. S. 577, 580, 75 L. Ed. 558, 561.
"The court cited Origet v. United States, (1888) 125 U.S. 240,
245-247, 8 S. Ct. 846, 31 L. Ed. 743, 746, 747.
"United States v. Nicherson, (1854) 17 Harv. (58 U.S.) 204, 15
L. Ed. 219. See (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 522, 546-558.
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prosecution involved another ten dollar counterfeit note, even
though evidence was given as to the second counterfeit note in
the first prosecution, Mr. Chief Justice iarshall ruled against
the accused, saying:
"The plea does not show that he had ever been indicted for
passing the same counterfeit bill,52or that he had ever been put
in jeopardy for the same offense.
In a case coming up from the Territory of Utah it was held
that the offense of cohabiting with more than one woman was
inherently a continuous offense, having duration, and not an
53
Thus numerous proseoffense consisting of an isolated act.
cutions may be barred, and habeas corpus may lie. Only one
punishment may be inflicted for the same continuous act.
Defendant should be able to plead in bar such punishment to
prevent further punishment.
Merely because a statute54 provides that the indictment for
using the mails to defraud may charge offenses to the number of
three when committed in the same six calendar months and that
the court shall give a single sentence, there is no intention to
make a single continuous offense. 55 Hence the defendant may
be indicted and sentenced for three other offenses under the
same statute, committed in the same six months. There can be
no valid plea of former conviction in such a case.
The conviction of the defendant for the crime of unlawful
cohabitation bars a prosecution for adultery when the latter
offense is in fact a part of a continuous cohabitation with the
woman named in the first indictment, even though the time of
its comission is laid after the period during which the cohabitation was alleged to have continued. 56 If a demurrer to such
plea of former conviction is sustained, the defendant may be
released on habeas corpus. There are many offenses as to which
a conviction or an acquittal of a greater crime is a bar to a
prosecution for a lesser one.
An acquittal upon a charge of having received the corn"United States v. Rauderbush, (1834) 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 288, 290,
8 L. Ed. 948.
"Ex parte Snow, (1887) 120 U. S. 274, 30 L. Ed. 658, 7 S.Ct. 556.

The court cited 1 Wharton, Criminal Law, 9th ed., Sections 27, 931.

"1U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5480.
"Ex parte Henry, (1887) 123 U. S. 372, 31 L. Ed. 174, 8 S.Ct. 142.
"Ex parte Nielsen, (1889) 131 U. S. 176, 9 S. Ct. 672, 33 L. Ed.
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pensation forbidden by the statutes from a specified person,
described in the indictment as an officer and employee of a
corporation, will not sustain a plea in bar of a prosecution upon
the charge of having received such compensation from the corporation, where the accused declined to plead further after his
demurrer to the answer, alleging that the two offenses are not
identical, was overruled. 57 The same evidence would not
sustain both indictments.
In a case coming up from the Philippine Islands, Mr.
Justice Holmes held that treating as two different offenses
assaults on two different persons is not under the Philippine Bill
of Rights placing twice in jeopardy, even if these assaults
occurred very near each other, in one continuing attempt to
defy the law. 58
A plea of former jeopardy as to an indictment for murder
cannot be based upon the fact, that upon the trial of two consolidated indictments for two other murders committed by
defendant on the same day as the one charged in the indictment in question, he was found not guilty on the issue of
insanity, which is the defense set up to such indictment.5 9
In a case coming up from the Philippine Islands it was
held not double jeopardy since the acts were not identical,
where defendant was convicted of behaving in an indecent
manner in a public place, open to public view, and later
prosecuted for insulting a public officer by word or deed in his
presence, although the acts and words of the accused set forth
in both charges are the same.60 Each offense had an element
not embraced in the other.
Each successive cutting into the different mail bags with
intent to steal the mail therefrom by a person who in the same
transaction tears or cuts successively a number of bags, is a
distinct offense under Section 18961 of the Federal Criminal
"Burton v. United States, (1906) 202 U.S. 344, 50 L. Ed. 1057,
26 S. Ct. 688, 697. The court cited 1 Bishop, Criminal Law, sec. 1051.
sFlemister v. United States, (1907) 207 U.S. 372, 52 L. Ed. 252,
28 S. Ct. 129, Harlan, J., dissenting.
Hotema v. United States, (1902) 186 U.S. 413, 46 L. Ed. 1225,
22 S. Ct. 895.
1 Gavieres v. United States, (1911) 220 U.S. 338, 55 L. Ed. 489,
31 S.61Ct. 421, Harlan, J., dissenting.
Act of March, 1909, chap. 321, 35 Stat. at L. 1124, Comp. St.,

sec. 10359.
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Code. 62 Proof of cutting one sack would not support the counts
of an indictment or to cutting other sacks, and there was no
such continuity of offense as to make the several acts charged
against the defendant only one crime. The same rule has been
applied where one offense was stealing postage stamps from a
post office and the other was burglarious entry of a post office
with intent to commit a larceny. 3 The court stated that the
jeopardy provision was not violated.
Congress may enact that each putting of a letter in a post
office is a separate offense.8 4 An indictment in separate courts
charging unauthorized sales of narcotics to different persons on
different days in violation of statute does not charge merely a
single crime. 65 It does not amount to double jeopardy to prosecute for both the sale and the possession of the identical
liquor. 66
Acquittal of the charge of making a false entry in the
journal ledger of a Federal Reserve Bank under an act of Congress prosecuting any officer of a Federal Reserve Bank who
makes any false entry in any book of the bank, is a bar to a
prosecution for making a false entry in the customer's ledger,
where both entries referred to the same transaction, were based
upon the same draft, and were the correlated means of
accomplishing a single fraud, if fraud there had been.67 But
such acquittal is not a bar to a prosecution for making a false
report of the condition of a Federal Reserve Bank, since the
acquittal does not necessarily establish that the entries were
true, but only that at the time the defendant was not guilty of
an intent to defraud the bank and the examiners. The former
judgment is res judicata as to the facts there involved, but it is
not a former acquittal.
Ebeling v. Morgan, (1915) 237 U. S. 625, 59 L. Ed. 1151, 35 S. Ct.

710. The court cited Gavieres v. United States, (1911) 220 U. S. 338,
55 L. Ed. 489, 31 S. Ct. 421. The court referred to as distinguishable
as involving a continuous offense. In re Snow, (1887) 120 U. S. 274,

30 L. Ed. 658, 7 S. Ct. 556.
"Morgan v. Devine, (1915) 237 U. S. 632, 59 L. Ed. 1153, 35 S. Ct.
712. 7 Badders
v. United States, (1916) 240 U.S. 391,
36 S. Ct. 367.

The court cited Ebeling v. Morgan, (1915) 237 U.S. 625; In re Henry,
(1887) 123 U.S. 372, 374, 31 L.Ed. 174.

' United States v. Daugherty, (1926) 269 U.S. 360, 70 L. Ed. 309,

46 S. Ct. 156.

"Albrecht v. United States, (1927) 273 U.S. 1, 11, 71 L. Ed. 505,
511, 47 S. Ct. 250.
"United States v. Adams, (1930) 281 U.S. 202, 74 L. Ed. 807.
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Although a second sale of a narcotic drug is made to the
same purchaser with no substantial interval of time between the
delivery of the drug in the first transaction and payment for
the second quantity sold the two sales are not a single continuing
offense, but separate violations of the Harrison Narcotic Act. 68
A single sale in violation of one requirement of the Harrison
Act that sales shall be in or from the original stamped package,
and another requirement of a written order of the purchaser to
whom the drug is sold, constitutes separate offenses for each of
which a penalty may be imposed, since each provision requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not.
In 1820 the Supreme Court seems to have thought that the
sentence of either court, whether of conviction or acquittal,
might be pleaded in bar of prosecution before the other.6 9 This
was said in a case involving a state court-martial for violation
of a state law as to state militia neglecting to serve when ordered
by the President of the United States.
Former jeopardy in a federal trial is no defense against a
state prosecution for the same act. This was applied to a state
prosecution for harboring and secreting a negro slave arising
70
before the Civil War.
Where a United States marshal, in state custody for an act
done in furtherance of a law of the United States, is brought
before a federal court by habeas corpus and discharged, he can7
not later be tried in the state courts. 1
Apparently the doctrine of former jeopardy is applicable
in court martial cases.7 2 In a case coming up from the Philippine Islands it was held that where a soldier in the American
army was acquitted of the crime of homicide alleged to have
M
Blockburger v. United States, (1932) 284 U.S. 299, 76 L. Ed.
306. See Horack, Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act,
(1937) 21 Minn. L. Rev. 805; Notes (1931) 49 Yale L. J. 462; (1937)
7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 79, (1938) 112 A.L.R. 983.
* Houston v. Moore, (1820) 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) 1, 31, 5 L. Ed. 19.
But compare the view of Mr. Justice William Johnson, concurring
in 5 Wheat. (18 U. S.) 1, 32, 33-34. Story, J., in a dissenting opinion
thought that double punishment would violate "the principles of the
common law, and the genius of our free government." 5 Wheat.
(18 U.S.) 1, 47, 72.
"Moore v. People of State of fllinois, (1852) 14 Harv. (55 U.S.
13, 14 L. Ed. 306, McLean, J., dissenting.
Cunningham v. Nagle, (1890) 135 U. S. 1, 34 L. Ed. 55, 10 S. Ct.
658. Rottschaefer on ConstitutionalLaw, (1939) 114.
"Carter v. McClaughry, (1902) 183 U.S. 365, 46 L. Ed. 236, 22
S. Ct. 181, 190.
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been committed by him in the Philippines by a court-martial of
the United States he could not be subsequently tried for the
same offense in a civil court exercising authority in that territory as to crimes.73 The reason assigned was that the laws
making that conduct punishable emanated from the same ultimate
source.
Former jeopardy in a state criminal proceeding is no
defense against a subsequent prosecution by the federal government for the same act which violated both a state and a federal
statute.7 4 Congress could by express provision bar a federal
prosecution after the state prosecution, if it chose to do so. The
Fifth Amendment jeopardy provision applies only to prosecution in the federal courts. Former jeopardy in a federal
criminal trial is no defense against a state prosecution for the
75
same act violating both state and federal laws.

As between the Federal government and the Territory of
Puerto Rico prosecution under one of the laws in the appropriate court will bar a prdsecution under the other law in
another court.7 6

However, the mere fact that Congress has

passed a statute does not bar a territory from passing a statute
on the same subject. Thus both might pass an anti-trust act,
though prosecution under one act in one court will bar prosecution under the other act in another court.
WITN-ESSES: COMPULSORY

PROCESS, LIST OF WITNESSES

The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right .

. .

. to have com-

pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
As Professor Rottschaefer has pointed out the case law
construing the scope of this right is extremely meager.7 7 The
"Grafton v. United States, (1907) 206 U.S. 333, 51 L. Ed. 1884,

27 S. Ct. 749, 11 Ann. Cas. 640. See Rottschaefer on Constitutional

Law, (1939) 815-816; Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 1309, 1320-1324; Crane, Double
Jeopardy and Courts-Martial, (1919) 3 Minn. L. Rev. 181.
,'United States v. Lanza, (1922) 260 U.S. 377, 67 L.Ed. 314,
43 S. Ct. 141. See Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions,
(1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 1309; Note, (1927) 12 Corn. L. Q. 212.
" Hebert v. Louisiana, (1926) 272 U.S. 312, 71 L. Ed. 270, 47
S. Ct. 103; Rottschaefer on ConstitutionalLaw, (1939) 816.

"People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Company, (1937) 302 U.S. 253,

264, 182 L. Ed. 235, 244.
Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law, (1939) 797. See also
Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, (1929),
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right seems so essential to an adequate opportunity for an
accused's presentation of his defense as to be required by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment in any criminal
proceedings to which the Sixth Amendment does not apply.
Neither the Sixth Amendment nor the federal statutes
accord the right to the accused to be apprised of the names of
the witnesses who appeared before the grand jury.1s Even in
cases of treason and other capital offenses, the required list of
witnesses is only of those who are to be produced in the trial. 79
Witnesses summoned to testify before a grand jury must
answer any question within his knowledge concerning the matter
under investigation subject to the privilege against selfincrimination. They are not concerned with the possible
invalidity of the statutes under which the grand jury's investigation is conducted, and the consequent want of jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, and they may not urge that objection
to justify their contumacy in refusing to testify., 0 If they do,
they are guilty of contempt.
The First Judiciary Act regulated the mode of proof by
examination of witnesses, and their duty to appear and testify
was recognized. 8 ' By Act of -March, 2, 1793, subpoenas for
witnesses required to attend a court of the United States in any
district might run into any other district.8 2 By Act of February 26, 1853, witnesses required to attend any term of the
district court on the part of the United States may be subpoenaed to attend to testify; and under such process they shall
appear before the grand jury or petit jury or both, as required
sections 490-494, 2187, 2194; Hughes, Federal Practice,vol. 9 (1931),
sections 7095-7105; 18 U.S.C.A., sections 562, 563; 28 U.S.C.A.,
sections 654-660.
"Wilson v. United States, (1911) 221 U. S. 361, 55 L. Ed. 771,

31 S. Ct. 538, 542.
" 18 U. S. C. A., section 562; Logan v. United States, (1892) 144
U.S. 304, 36 L. Ed. 443, 12 S. Ct. 617. As to them, however, the
statute is mandatory. Johnson v. United States, (1912) 225 U.S. 405,
56 L. Ed. 1142, 1144, 32 S. Ct. 405. Inpliedly there need be no
such disclosure in lesser offenses. United States v. Van Duzee, (1891)
140 U.S. 169, 35 L. Ed. 399, 11 S. Ct. 58.
11Blair v. United States, (1919) 250 U.S. 273, 63 L. Ed. 797,
39 S. Ct. 438. As to requirement of taking of oath by witnesses see
(1940) 14 So. Calif. L. Rev. 80.
"'Sept. 24, 1789, chap. 20, sec. 30, 1 Stat. at L. 73, 88. For subsequent legislation see Rev. Stat., sections 861-865.

Chap. 22, sec. 6, 1 Stat. at L. 333, 335; Longsdorf and Nichols,

Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, vol. 2 (1929), sec. 492.

present statutes see 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 654.

For the

FnjxERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

by the court or the district attorney.8 3 By the same statute
fees for the attendance and mileage of witnesses were regulated;
and it was provided that where the United States was a party,
the marshal, on the order of the court, should pay such fees.
Statutes also require witnesses to give recognizances for their
appearance to testify, and for detaining them in prison in
84
default of such recognizance.
By statute 85 the right to summon witnesses where the
defendant is indigent is left to the discretion of the trial court.
86
Such discretion is not reviewable in the Supreme Court.
The right to object to a witness in a capital case on the
ground that his name was not furnished to defendant two days
before the trial, as required by the statute,8 7 is waived by failure to object until after his examination in chief is closed, even
if the omission was not before discovered since inquiry should
88
have been made before.
The statutory8 9 right to a list of witnesses does not apply
to witnesses introduced purely for rebuttal purposes.90
Where in a capital case a list of witnesses and jurors must
be delivered to the accused at least two days before the trial
under the federal statute, a woman who has been married and
divorced is not incompetent as a witness because she is
designated in the list of witnesses by her maiden name, under
which she had gone since her divorce some ten or twelve years
ago. 91 The list ought to contain the present names of the witnesses, which identify them. The purpose of the statute is to
let the accused know who will testify against him, and the present
law best does this. However, the use of the married name would
Chap. 80, sec. 3, 10 Stat. at L. 161, 169.
28 U. S. C. A., sections 657-659.
U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 878; 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 656.

"Goldsby v. United States, (1895) 160 U.S. 70, 40 L. Ed. 343,

16 S. Ct. 216. The court cited Crumpton v. United States, (1891) 138
U.S. 361, 364, 11 S. Ct. 355.
I U. S. Rev. Stat., see. 1033; 18 U. S. C. A., sec. 562. This statute
does not control the procedure of the courts of a territory. Thiede
v. Utah, (1835) 159, U. S. 510, 40 L. Ed. 237, 16 S. Ct. 62.
'Hickory v. United States, (1894) 151 U.S. 303, 38 L. Ed. 170,
14 S. Ct. 334.
"U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 1033; 18 U. S. C. A., sec. 562.
'"Goldsby v. United States, (1896) 160 U.S. 70, 40 L. Ed. 343,
16 S. Ct. 216.
m
" Bird v. United States, (1902) 187 U.S. 118, 47 L. Ed. 100, 104,
23 S. Ct. 42, 45.
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probably not have helped in the particular case. Timely
objection must be made to the use of an improper name.92
The Act of July 3, 1926, 93 providing for the subpoenaing
in a foreign country upon service by an American consul of a
citizen of the United States whose presence in a criminal prosecution in a federal court was desired, does not violate the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 94 If the citizen disobeys this statute in the foreign country, he is punishable by a
federal court. There is no violation of international law. He
may be punished for contempt of court even though he is not
present here if suitable notice and opportunity to appear and be
heard are given, by the seizure of his property to satisfy a fine.
This does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The fact that only
the prosecutor may subpoena may not be challenged by a
recalcitrant witness as violating the provision of the Sixth
Amendment that an accused shall have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor.
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION

OF HOSTILE WITNESSES

The Sixth Amendment grants to a defendant the right to
be confronted with the witnesses against him. Its purpose is
to protect him against secret and inquisitorial methods of trial,
and to secure to him the privilege of sifting and testing the evidence against him by cross-examination of the witnesses. 95 The
introduction of evidence given by witnesses when the defendant
has had no opportunity to cross-examine is clearly forbidden.
For this reason a statute making the record of the conviction of
one person of stealing given property conclusive evidence of the
fact that property had been stolen in the prosecution of the
receiver thereof is invalid. 96 However, the admission of dying
declarations is a well recognized exception to the general rule
based on necessity and historical considerations.
"The court cited Logan v. United States, (1892) 144 U.S. 263,
36 L. Ed. 429, 12 S.Ct. 617.
"Chap. 762, 44 Stat. at L. 35, 28 U. S. C. A., sections 711-718.
"Blackmer v. United States, (1932) 284 U.S. 421, 52 S.Ct. 252,
76 L.Ed. 375, noted 30 Col.L.Rev. 747; 17 Corn. L.Q. 117; 1 Geo.
Wash.L.Rev. 132; 2 IdahoL.J. 211; 30 Mich.L.Rev. 137 and 968;
6 So. Calif.L.Rev. 60; St. Louis L.Rev. 85 and 274; 65 U.S.L.Rev.
640. Rottschaefer
on ConstitutionalLaw, (1939) 795-797; Longsdorf
and Nichols, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, vol. 5 (1929), sec.
1634; Hughes, Federal Practice,vol. 9 (1931), sec. 7093.
"Kirby v. United States, (1899) 174 U.S. 47, 43 L. Ed. 890, 15
S. Ct. 574, Brown and McKenna, J.J., dissenting.
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The right of confrontation secured by the Sixth Amendment did not originate with the Constitution. The Constitution merely recognized the common law right. The purpose of
the Sixth Amendment was to continue and preserve such right
and not to broaden it or disturb the exceptions.9 7 The basic
exception to the rule has been thus stated by Mr. Justice
Peckham:
"At common law, the right existed to read a deposition
upon the trial of a defendant, if such deposition had been taken
when the defendant was present and had an opportunity to
cross-examine, upon proof being made to the satisfaction of the
court that the witness was at the time of the trial dead, insane,
too ill ever to be expected to attend the trial, or kept away by
the connivance of the defendant."9s
In a case coming up from the Territory of Utah it was held
that where the absence of a witness is due to the defendant's
own procurement, his rights were not violated by admitting
proof of what such witness had stated on a former trial of the
accused even though under a different indictment. 99
Where a witness for the prosecution in a murder case dies
after the first trial, the reading in evidence on the second trial of
a transcribed copy of the reporter's stenographic notes of his
testimony is not forbidden by the confrontation rule.10 0 This is
the rule prevailing in the state courts. The primary object of
the constitutional provision was to protect against the use of
depositions or ex parte affidavits, in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness. Public policy favors
an exception in the case stated. If the accused offers evidence
to show that the witness later stated that his testimony was
under duress and untrue, he must lay the usual foundation for
impeaching testimony. 0 1
"Robertson v. Baldwin, (1897) 165 U.S. 275, 41 L.Ed. 715, 17
S. Ct. 326; Kirby v. United States, (1899) 174 U. S. 47, 43 L. Ed. 890,
19 S. Ct. 574; Salinger v. United States, (1926) 272 U. S. 542, 71 L. Ed.

398.

" West v. Louisiana, (1904) 194 U.S. 258, 262, 48 L.Ed. 965, 969,
24 S.Ct. 650.
"Reynolds v. United States, (1878) 98 U.S. 145, 158, 25 L. Ed.

244. Field, J., thought that a sufficient foundation had not been laid
for its introduction.
'"Mattox v. United States, (1895) 156 U.S. 237, 39 L. Ed. 409,
15 S."Ct.
337.
Shiras,
Gray, and White, J. J., dissented on this point.
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The right to confrontation is not infringed by permitting a
deposition of a living witness to be read against the accused in
an action brought to recover the value of merchandise forfeited
102
to the United States by reason of his acts in violation of law.
There is no right of trial by jury either as to the enforcement
or forfeiture.
It violates the Sixth Amendment to present a deposition or
statement of an absent witness taken at a preliminary examination at which the accused had an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness, to be read at the final trial, when it does not appear
that the witness was absent by the suggestion, connivance, or
procurement of the accused, but it does appear that his absence
was due to the neligence of the prosecution. 10 3 The witness was
a witness for the prosecution. He had been committed to jail
without bail. A federal officer took him from jail after the trial
of the case began, but did not place him in charge of another
officer, but rather another governmental witness, with instructions to the latter to allow him to stay at a hotel at night with
his family. On the very day he was called as a witness and
within an hour of being called, he was in the corridor of the
court house. But when called to testify, he did not appear.
In a state court case it was held that due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment was not denied by the introduction in
evidence, upon proof of non-residence, permanent abode, and
inability to procure the attendance of a witness, of the deposition of such witness, taken upon the preliminary examination
before a committing magistrate when defendant was present
and their counsel was afforded opportunity to cross-examine.' 0 4
The case was not so different from that involving death, illness,
or insanity of the witness. The court pointed out that the con'United States v. Zucker, (1896) 161 U.S. 475, 40 L.Ed. 777,
16 S. Ct. 641. Professor Rottschaefer points out that there is language in this case which might be construed to hold that the right
exists in all criminal prosecutions of whatever sort or degree. Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law, (1939) 792. But he points out, at
p. 797, that if the phrase "criminal prosecutions" has the same meaning as it has in defining the cases in which the Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial, then the right of confrontation does not exist in
the trial of misdemeanors and petty offenses.
'Motes v. United States, (1900) 178 U.S. 458, 44 L. Ed. 1150,
20 S. Ct. 993. The court cited Reynolds v. United States, (1878)

98 U.S.
145, 158, 159, 25 L. Ed. 244, 247.
1
West v. Louisiana, (1904) 194 U. S. 258, 48 L. Ed. 965, 24 S. Ct.

650. The court revived its earlier decisions, most of them in federal
court cases.
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frontation provision of the Sixth Amendment did not apply to
state courts.
In a case coming up from the Philippine Islands the court
held a Philippine appellate court could order the judge and
clerk of the court below to supply the failure of the record to
show whether the accused pleaded to the complaint and was
present in court during the entire trial. 10 5 This did not violate
the provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights regarding confrontation of witnesses. The judicial officers involved were not
witnesses.
Improper admission of hearsay evidence may violate the
right of confrontation of witnesses.1 0 6 The admission in a
prosecution for conspiracy of testimony by one conspirator of
what another of them, since dead, told him during the progress
07
of the conspiracy is not reversible error.'
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment relating to the right
to be confronted by witnesses is to continue and preserve the
common-law right, and not to broaden or disturb its exceptions.108 And the admission in evidence against a defendant of
letters with which he was not primarily connected is not error
on the ground that they were hearsay, where they were placed
before and answered by him.
The privilege of confrontation is not the same thing as the
privilege of presence. 10 9 The privilege of confrontation is
limited to the stages of the trial when there are witnesses to be
questioned. It has always been subject to exceptions, such as
dying declarations or documentary evidence. The exceptions
are not static but may be enlarged from time to time if there is
no material departure from the rule.
In a case coming up from the Philippine Islands it was held
that an inspection of the scene of a homicide, made by the trial
IDowdell v. United States, (1911) 221 U.S. 325, 55 L. Ed. 753,
31 S. Ct. 590, Harlan, J., dissenting.

I"Delaney v. United States, (1924) 263 U.S. 586, 68 L. Ed. 462,

44 S. Ct. 206; Dobie on Federal Procedure, (1928) 83. The court
cited Diaz v. United States, (1912) 223 U.S. 422, 450, 56 L. Ed. 500,
503, 32 S. Ct. 250, Ann. Cas. 1913, c. 1138.
'"The court cited Wiborg v. United States, (1896 163 U.S. 632,
658, 41 L. Ed. 289, 298, 16 S. Ct. 1127.
1 Salinger v. United States, (1926) 272 U. S. 398, 71 L. Ed. 398.

'Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, (1934) 291 U.S.
97, 107, 78 L. Ed. 674, 679, 54 S. Ct. 330, 90 A. L. R. 575, noted 14
Boston U. L. Rev. 402, 34 Col. L. Rev. 767, 19 Corn. L. Q. 477, 13 A. T.
69, 2 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 517, 22 Geo. L. J. 606, 24 J. Crim. L. 1102,
12 N. Car. L. Rev. 267, 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 643.
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judge in the presence of counsel for the accused, but in the
absence of the accused, did not violate the right to "meet the
witnesses face to face" secured by the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902.110
CONTINUANCE

There is no federal statute enumerating the grounds upon
which a continuance may or should be granted, nor the number
that may be granted."" There are only court decisions, which
establish no absolute grounds.
'Whether or not the trial should be delayed for several days
in order to grant defendant's application, made four days after
the trial began and just before he called his last witness, for
process for additional witnesses, to be served at the expense of
the government, is in the discretion of the trial court." 2 Its
refusal is not ground for a new trial, especially when the additional evidence does not seem important.
In a state court case it was held that the fact that the shorthand notes of the testimony taken on the preliminary examination had not been transcribed as provided for by state statute
was not ground for postponing the trial." 3
It has been held that it was within the court's discretion to
refuse a continuance on the ground that prior to the finding of
the indictment the defendant was in jail, and unable to prepare
his defense, and that he was informed that if further time was
given him there were witnesses whose names were not disclosed
in the application who could be produced to show his innocence." 4 Absence of material witnesses does not require the
granting of a continuance unless due diligence to procure their
'Valdez v. United States, (1917) 244 U.S. 432, 61 L. Ed. 1242,
1248, 37 S. Ct. 725.
'

Brewster on Federal Procedure, (1940)

597.

For other dis-

cussions of continuances see Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclopedia of
Federal Procedure, vol. 5 (1929), sections 2198-2210; Hughes, Federal Practice,vol. 9 (1931), sec. 7066.
' Crumpton v. United States, (1891) 138 U. S. 361, 34 L. Ed. 958,
11 S. Ct. 355.
... Thiede v. Utah, (1895) 159 U.S. 510, 40 L. Ed. 237, 239, 16

S. Ct. 62.
" Goldsby v. United States, (1895)

16 S.Ct. 216.

160 U.S. 70, 40 L. Ed. 343,

FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

attendance is shown. 118
shown.16

What they would testify to must be

In a state court case it was held that, although an accused
may be entitled to adequate opportunity to prepare his defense,
this does not entitle him under the Fourteenth Amendment to
a continuance because of the absence of material witnesses residing in another state whose presence the court is powerless to
enforce."1 7 A state may not compel the attendance of witnesses
beyond the state. It is not bound to provide for the filing or
using of depositions of each absent witness.
In a case coming up from Alaska is was held not an abuse
of discretion to refuse a continuance to a defendant charged
with a capital offense, on a showing by his affidavit of the absence of witnesses who would testify that he was not at the scene
of the crime at the time named in the indictment as the date of
its commission and would also explain the possession of money
found on his person, when nothing had been disclosed to indicate that the possession of such money had any significance in
connection with the charge, and the falsity of some of the statements in the defendant's affidavit clearly appeared from the
affidavits offered by the government in opposition to the motion."1 8 The court could give weight to the fact that the witnesses were engaged in prospecting, were men without settled
abodes whose attendance at a later time might be hard to secure,
and the longer the delay the harder it would be to secure the
attendance of the witnesses. In this case the absent witnesses
were on a vessel at sea or in California.
The discretion of the trial judge was not wrongly exercised
in ordering jurymen to be summoned to appear on the day following the one set for the hearing of a demurrer to an indictment, and, after overruling the demurrer on the day of hearing, in ordering the entry of a plea of not guilty on the next day,
refusing a continuance, impaneling a jury, and setting down
I Isaacs v. United States, (1895) 159 U.S. 487, 40 L. Ed. 229,
16 S. Ct. 51.
'Hardy v. United States, (1902) 186 U.S. 224, 46 L. Ed. 1137,
22 S. Ct. 889.
11 Minder v. State of Georgia, (1902) 183 U. S. 559, 46 L. Ed. 328,
22 S. Ct. 224; Rottschaefer on ConstitutionalLaw, (1940) 811.
'Hardy v. United States, (1902) 186 U.S. 224, 46 L. Ed. 1137,
22 S.Ct. 889.
L J.-4
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the trial for the next morning. 119 In a particular case, however,
the facts may be such that the court should grant a con120
tinuance.
The discretion of the court in granting or denying a continuance is not reviewable except in case of clear abuse, especially where the absence of any bill of exceptions in the record
121
prevents any showing of abuse.
NoLiE PROSEQUI
In an early case it was ruled that where a writ of error had
been taken out to the Supreme Court, in an indictment found
and tried in the circuit court, and a nolle prosequi was entered
in the circuit court by order of the President of the United
States, and a copy of the same was ified in the office of the clerk
of the Supreme Court, and read in open court, the Supreme
Court would on motion of the Attorney General dismiss the
22
case.1
In criminal proceedings the prosecution alone, and not the
victim or injured party, have the right to control the whole proceeding and execution of the sentence. According to Mr. Justice
Story even after verdict, the government may choose not to
23
bring the party up for sentence. 1
A nolle prosequi may be of the entire indictment, or of one
or more counts thereof. 124 It is not an acquittal, and leaves the
prosecution just as if no such count had been inserted in the
indictment.
The District Attorney has absolute power to enter a nolle
I Frohwerk v. United States, (1919) 249 U.S. 204, 63 L. Ed. 561,
39 S. Ct. 249.
'Harker, The Control of Criminal Prosecutions in Federal
Courts, (1914) 8 Ill. L. Rev 373; Isaacs v. United States, (1895) 159
U. S. 487, 40 L. Ed. 129, 16 S. Ct. 51.
'Pickett v. United States, (1910) 216 U.S. 456, 54 L. Ed. 566,
569, 30 S. Ct. 265.
'2United States v. Phillips, (1832), 6 Pet. (31 U. S.) 776, 8 L. Ed.
578.
For discussion of nolle prosequi see Longsdorf and Nichols,
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, (1929), vol. 5, sections 2211-2214;
comment, (1919) 13 Ill. L. Rev. 706; Winfield, Nolle Prosequi, (1884)
5 Crim. L. Mag. 1; comments, (1938) 112 A. L. R. 386.
'United States v. Murphy and Morgan, (1842) 16 Pet. (41 U. S.)
203, 209, 10 L. Ed. 937, 940.
""Dealy v. United States, (1894) 152 U.S. 539, 38 L. Ed. 545,
14 S. Ct. 680.

FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

prosequi.125 This is true at least at any time before the jury is
12 8
impaneled for the trial of the case.
Where a nolle prosequi to an indictment has been entered,
and no new indictment has been returned within the statutory
period of limitation, the case becomes moot. 1 2 7 In that event
the accused cannot appeal from an order discharging him pursuant to leave to enter a nolle. The defendant being discharged
from custody is not legally aggrieved.

PRIVILEGE

AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' " - s Inasmuch as this provision is necessary to the full
enjoyment of personal security, liberty and private property it
should receive a liberal construction to prevent any encroachment on the right secured. 129 The privilege applies to civil as
well as criminal proceedings.130 It applies to the production of
books and papers of an incriminating nature as well as to oral
testimony.' 3 '
The privilege does not apply where the speech would not
incriminate, as where the witness has been pardoned, 132 or where
'= Confiscation Cases, (1869) 7 Wall. (U. S.) 454, 457, 19 L. Ed.
196, 197, opinion by Clifford, J. For the statute concerning the duties
of the District Attorney see 28 U.S. C. A., sec. 485 and notes of
decisions.
I Brewster on FederalProcedure, (1940) 598; Confiscation Cases,
(1869) 7 Wall. (U. S.) 454, 457, 19 L. Ed. 196, 197.
MLewis v. United States, (1910) 216 U.S. 611, 54 L. Ed. 637, 30
S. Ct. 438.
'e For discussion see Rottschaefer on ConstitutionalLaw, (1939)
748-749, 800-805; E. S. Corwin; The Supreme Court's Construction of
the Self-Incrimination Clause, (1930) 29 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 191; J. A. C.
Grant, Immunity from Compulsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal
System of Government, (1934-1935) 9 TempleL. Quart. 57, 194;
Rapacz, Rules Governing the Allowance of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, (1935) 19 Minn.L. Rev. 426; Frank Irvine, The
Third Degree and the Privilege Against Self-Crimination, (1928)
13 Corn.L. Quart. 211; Judge John C. Knox, Self-Incrimination,
(1925) 74 U.Pa.L.Rev. 139; Byrne, Federal Criminal Procedure,
(1916) sections 269-273; Longsdorf and Nicholas, (1929), vol. II, sections 500-510.
" Gould v. United States, (1921) 255 U.S. 298, 65 L. Ed. 647,
41 S. Ct. 261 (certificate).
'McCarthy v. Arndstein, (1924) 266 U.S. 34, 69 L. Ed. 158,
45 S. Ct. 16, affirming on rehearing, (1923) 262 U.S. 355, 67 L. Ed.
1023, 43 S. Ct. 562
"Boyd v. United States, (1886) 116 U.S. 616, 29 L. Ed. 746,
6 S. Ct. 524.
'Hale v. Henkel, (1906) 201 U. S. 43, 50 L. Ed. 652, 26 S. Ct.
370.
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the offense which his testimony discloses is barred by limitations.' 33 A tender of a pardon will not abrogate the privilege
if the witness refuses to receive it.34
Congress may compel the giving of testimony which will
incriminate provided it accords the witness immunity from the
consequences commensurate with the guaranty against selfincrimination afforded by the Fifth Amendment.' 35
The Fifth Amendment extends its protection to a witness
called to testify before a federal grand jury which is investigating alleged violations of the interstate commerce law.' 30 It is
not limited to prosecutions against the witness himself.
The use before a grand jury as a basis for an indictment
for perjury of certain exhibits impounded in the custody of the
clerk of the court for future use, which were owned by the
alleged perjurer, and which he had himself offered in evidence
in litigation over a patent, in the success of which he was interested, does not constitute an unreasonable seizure, nor selfincrimination. 13 7 The accused has voluntarily surrendered the
evidence in question.
The use in evidence of letters voluntarily written by the accused after the crime, while he was in prison, and which came
into the possession of the prison officials under established practice reasonably demanded to promote discipline does not violate
the constitutional safeguards against self-incrimination or unreasonable searches and seizures.' 38
The privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment prevents the use in evidence against him of a person's involuntary confession.' 3 9 There is no federal statute
governing the admissibility of confessions.' 40 The point that
'Brown v. Walker, (1896) 161 U. S. 591, 40 L. Ed. 810, 16 S.
Ct. 644.
"'Burdick v. United States, (1914) 236 U.S. 79, 59 L. Ed. 476,
35 S. Ct. 267.
1 Glickstein v. United States, (1911) 222 U. S. 139, 56 L. Ed. 128,
32 S. Ct. 71.
1 Counselman v. Hitchcock, (1892) 142 U. S. 547, 35 L. Ed. 1110,
12 C. Ct. 195.
1 Perlman v. United States, (1918) 247 U.S. 7, 62 L. Ed. 950,
38 S. Ct. 417; Dobie on FederalProcedure, (1928) 98.
1 Stroud v. United States, (1921) 251 U.S. 15, 64 L. Ed. 103,
40 S. Ct. 50; Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law, (1939) 742.
'Bram v. United States, (1897) 168 U.S. 532, 18 S. Ct. 183,
42 L. Ed. 588; Rottschaefer on ConstitutionalLaw, (1939) 802.
' Brewster on Federal Procedure, (1940) 615.
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the accused was under arrest at the time of confessing is not
conclusive, but may be taken into account in determining
whether or not the statement was voluntary. The statements
were inadmissible where they were made to a police officer in the
latter's office, no other persons being present, after the accused
had been stripped of his clothing, and after the officer had said
to him that his co-suspect had made a statement that he saw him
commit the act, and the officer further said he was satisfied that
the prisoner had killed the deceased.
Voluntary statements made by a defendant before and after
his preliminary examination are not made inadmissible against
him, because the provisions of the statutes, 14 1 with respect to
statements pending an examination, were not complied with,
although made to the magistrate who in fact conducted the preliminary examination. 142 Such a holding was rendered in a case
coming up from Alaska. It appeared that the accused was cautioned that he was under no obligation to make a statement;
that it would be used against him if he made one; and that there
was a proper time to make one if he so desired.
The admission in evidence at the trial of the testimony of
the accused, voluntarily and understandingly given at the preliminary hearing, does not violate his privilege against selfincrimination, although he was not warned at the time that what
14 3
he said might be used against him.
In a case coming up from the Territory of Alaska it was
held that a deputy marshal may testify as to conversations between himself and the accused which were not induced by
duress, intimidation, or other improper influences, but were perfectly voluntary. 144
In a case coming up from Puerto Rico the court held that
where the question of the voluntary character of a confession is
submitted to the jury at the request of the defendant, this is not
reviewable error even though the proof as to th voluntary
1- 30 Stat. at L. 1319, chap. 429, sections 307-311.

"Hardy v. United States, (1902) 186 U.S. 224, 46 L.Ed. 1137,
22 S. Ct. 889.
1 Powers v. United States, (1912) 223 U.S. 303, 56 L. Ed. 448,

32 S. Ct. 281. The court cited Wilson v. United States, (1896) 162
U. S. 613, 623, 40 L. Ed. 1090, 16 S. Ct. 895.

I"Perovich v. United States, (1907) 205 U.S. 86, 51 L. Ed. 722,

27 S.Ct. 456.
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character was of such a preponderating character that the court
1 45
would have been authorized in not submitting it to the jury.
A statement made by one accused of murder, after he has
been subjected for seven days to almost continuous examination
by police officers, which, on one occasion, continued throughout
the night, during all of which time he was ill and in pain, such
that the medical examiner testified that, to secure relief, he
would have confessed to a capital offense-is not admissible
upon his trial for murder. 146 The court gave no precise reason
for excluding the confession, except that it was not voluntary.
It has been urged that other reasons are the compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment and the doctrine of testimonial
7
unworthiness.14
In a state court criminal case it was held that due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment was denied where the sole
basis for a conviction and sentence is a confession by coercion,
brutality and violence. 148 It has been asserted that the same
principle would also apply in defining what the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment requires in the case of federal
criminal trials. 149
Where an accused takes the stand in his own behalf and
voluntarily testifies for himself, he may not stop short in his
testimony by omitting to explain incriminatory circumstances
and events already in evidence in which he participated, without
subjecting his silences to the inferences naturally to be drawn
from them, and justifying comment by the court in his charge
to the effect that the jury may take this omission into consideration in reaching a verdict.' 50 An act of Congress of March 16,
1878, permits the accused voluntarily to testify for himself. 151
One may waive his immunity from self-incrimination by
'Kent

S. Ct. 55.

v. Porto Rico, (1907)

207 U.S. 113, 52 L. Ed. 127, 28

'"Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, (1924) 266 U.S. 1, 69 L. Ed.
131, and note, 45 S. Ct. 1.
"'7
Waite, Cases on Criminal Law and Procedure, (First ed., 1937),
618 note.
" Brown v. State of Mississippi, (1936) 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct.
461, 80 L. Ed. 682, noted 36 Col. L. Rev. 832, 12 Ind.L. J. 66.
'Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law, (1939) 812.
'Caminetti v. United States, (1917) 242 U.S. 470, 493, 61 L.Ed.
442, 456, 37 S.Ct. 192, L. R. A. 1917, F. 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168. As
-the case indicates the circuit courts of appeals had been in conflict.
In 20 Stat. at L. 30, chap. 37, Comp. Stat. 1319, sec. 1465.
'• Raffel v. United States, (1926) 271 U.S. 494, 70 L.Ed. 1054,
46 S.Ct. 566 (certificate); Tower v. United States, (1912) 223 U.S.
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offering himself as a witness. 152 He may then be required to
answer all questions put to him within the legitimate bounds of
cross-examination. An accused becoming a witness in his own
behalf on a second trial of the case may be cross-examined as
to why he did not become a witness at the first trial. The failure
of an accused who becomes a witness on his own behalf to deny
or explain evidence of incriminatory circumstances of which he
may have knowledge may be the basis of adverse influence, and
the jury may be so instructed.
In a case coming up from Oklahoma Territory Mr. Justice
Holmes stated that compelling the accused to stand up and walk
before the jury, and stationing the jury during a recess so as
to observe his size and walk, even if regarded as error, as to
which the court expressed no opinion, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court so as to justify relief by habeas corpus. 53
The extent to which the privilege against self-incrimination
protects one against being compelled to submit to an examina154
tion of his person has been the matter of but few decisions.
It does not prevent testimony that an accused had put on a particular blouse and that it had fitted him, which was given to
prove that it was his, even though he had done so ufider
duress.' 55 The Fifth Amendment was asserted not to require
the exclusion of an accused's body as evidence when it might
be material.
The privilege against self-incrimination does not protect the
officer of a corporation in resisting the compulsory production
before the grand jury under a subpoena duces tecum directed
to the corporation, of the letter-press copy books of such corporation in his possession, because the contents thereof may tend
to incriminate him, even though the inquiry before the grand
jury was not directed to the corporation itself. 56 The same is
15 7
true where the subpoena is addressed to the officer.
303, 56 L. Ed. 448, 32 S. Ct. 281; Sawyer v. United States, (1906)
202 U.S. 150, 50 L. Ed. 972, 26 S. Ct. 575, 6 Ann. Case 269; Rottschaefer on ConstitutionalLaw, (1939) 805; (1922) 36 Harv. L. Rev.
207.
Matter of Moran, (1906) 203 U. S. 96, 51 L. Ed. 105, 27 S. Ct.
25, 27.
~Rottschaefer on ConstitutionalLaw, (1939) 802.
"Holt
v. United States, (1910) 218 U.S. 245, 54 L. Ed. 1021,
31 S. Ct. 2, 20 Ann. Cas. 1138.
'Wilson v. United States, (1911) 221 U.S. 361, 55 L. Ed. 771,
.31 S.Ct. 538.
,' Dreier v. United States, (1911) 221 U.S. 394, 31 S. Ct. 550.
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Since the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
may be waived, it is essential that the question of the validity
of the seizure of the objects which it is proposed to use in evidence be timely raised. It is timely raised by the making of a
preliminary motion for the return of the seized articles, or where
that is not reasonably possible, by a motion to exclude them as
evidence when tendered for that purpose. 158 The reason is that
courts will not pause in criminal cases to determine collateral
issues as to how the evidence was obtained.
The privilege against self-incrimination may not be relied
on and must be regarded as waived if not in some manner fairly
brought to the attenton of the tribunal which must pass upon
it.159
While a person may not invoke the privilege of selfincrimination to excuse his failure to make a Federal income
tax return with respect to income derived from crime, he may
invoke it to excuse the failure to answer any question on the
return the answer to which might incriminate the taxpayer.180
Although at one time there was some uncertainty, it has
now been settled that the privilege conferred by the Fifth
Amendment protects a person only against being required to disclose matters that could be directly or indirectly used against
him in Federal criminal, penal or forfeiture proceedings.' 6'
There is no privilege where the evidence might be used in a
criminal proceeding brought by a state or another country. 162
PRESENCE Op DEFENDANT

The Constitution does not in express language confer upon
a defendant the right to be present at his trial on a charge in a
'Agnello v. United States, (1925) 269 U.S. 20, 70 L. Ed. 145,
46 S. Ct. 4, 51 A. L. R. 409; Gould v. United States, (1921) 255 U. S.
298, 65 L. Ed. 647, 41 S. Ct. 261.
'" United States ex rel. Vajtayer v. Commissioner of Immigration, (1927) 273 U.S. 103, 113, 71 L. Ed. 560, 566 (deportation proceeding). The court cited United States v. Skinner (S. D. N. Y., 1914)
218 Fed. 870, 876; United States v. Elton (S. D. N. Y., 1915) 222 Fed.
428, 435.
m'United States v. Sullivan, (1927) 274 U.S. 259, 71 L. Ed. 1037,
47 S. Ct. 607, 51 A. L. R. 1020. See Rottschaefer on Constitutional
Law, (1939) 801.
"" Rottschaefer on ConstitutionalLaw, (1939) 804.
"United States v. Murdock, (1931) 284 U.S. 141, 52 S. Ct. 63,
76 L. Ed. 210, 82 A. L. R. 1376.
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federal court. 163 But it is broadly asserted that he has such a
right if he is being tried for a felony or on a capital charge.
The Sixth Amendment has been stated to be a source of the
right without indicating what particular provision gives the
right. 0 4 In a state court case it has been intimated that the
right to be heard which is guaranteed by due process includes
the right to be present whenever the presence of the defendant
bears a reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to
defend himself, but that it clearly does not go beyond that as
a matter of due process.' 6 5 His rights are therefore not violated
by denying him the right to be present at a view by the jury,
in the presence of the judge and the accused's counsel, of the
premises where the crime of murder was alleged to have been
committed. A view is not a trial nor a part of the trial nor is
it evidence.
The right based on the Sixth Amendment, extends in the case
of felonies and capital offenses, to every stage of the trial from
the impaneling of the jury to the reception of the verdict.' 66
An accused who is in custody, or one charged with a capital
offense may not waive this right, but one accused of a non-capital
felony and not in custody may probably waive.' 67
In a state court case it was pointed out that the privilege
to confront one's accusers and cross examine them face to face is
assured to a defendant by the Sixth Amendment in the Federal
courts.' 68 And the same case suggests that defendant be per"Rottschaefer on ConstitutionalLaw, (1939) 794. For Discussion of the general problems see Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclopedia
of Federal Procedure, (1929), sections 1635, 2290, 2326; Hughes, Federal Practice,vol. 9 (1931), sec. 7069; (1941), 20 Neb.L.Rev. 47.
'Diaz v. United States, (1912) 223 U.S. 442, 32 S. Ct. 250,
56 L. Ed. 500, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1138.
'Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, (1934) 291 U.S.
97, 54 S. Ct. 330, 78 L. Ed. 674, 90 A. L. R. 575. Four judges dissented.
See comments, 14 Boston U. L. Rev. 402, 19 Corn. L. Q. 477, 37 Col. L.
Rev. 767, 2 Duke B. A. J. 69, 22 Geo. L. J. 606, 2 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 517,
24 J. Crim. L. 1102, 12 N. Car. L. Rev. 267, 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 643.
'Diaz v. United States, (1912) 223 U.S. 442, 32 S. Ct. 250, 56
L. Ed. 500, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1138.
' 'Hopt v. People of Territory of Utah, (1884) 110 U.S. 574,
4 S. Ct. 202, 28 L. Ed. 262; Diaz v. United States, (1912) 223 U.S. 442,
32 S. Ct. 250, 56 L. Ed. 500, Ann. Cas. 1913, C. 1138.
"' Snyder v. Massachusetts, (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 78 L. Ed. 674,
54 S. Ct. 330, 90 A. L. R. 575, citing Gaines v. Washington, (1928)

277 U. S. 81, 85, 48 S. Ct. 468, 72 L. Ed. 793, 794.
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mitted to be present at the examination of jurors or the summing up of counsel. 169
In a decision under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment it was held that the right to be present is only with
170
respect to the trial court, and not the appellate court.
The Sixth Amendment does not apply to the trials of misdemeanors and petty offenses. Hence the right to be present at
such trial will perhaps be protected by the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment, but only so far as his presence is necessary to effectuate his right to be heard in defense of the
17
charge. '
In a case coming up from the Philippine Islands the
Supreme Court held that as to a felony not capital, an accused
who was not in custody and who was present when the trial
began could waive his right to be personally present at every
stage of the trial. 172 The voluntary absence of the defendant
at a time when his presence is not indispensable, coupled with
an express consent that the trial go on in the presence of his
counsel, is a waiver of his right to be present at every stage of
the trial. He was absent twice at a later stage of the trial, and
on these occasions two witnesses for the government were both
examined and cross-examined. In capital cases the right may
not be waived. If there be no waiver in felony cases, the accused
has a right to be present at every stage of the trial.
In Frank v. Mangum'7 3 the majority opinion summarized
the holding of an earlier case Lewis v. United States"74 as being
that it is a leading principle "pervading the entire law of
criminal procedure, that after indictment nothing should be
done in the absence of the prisoner"; and "that in the absence
of a statute, this right as it existed at common law must not be
abridged."
' The court cited Lewis v. United States, (1892) 146 U. S. 370,
13 S. Ct. 136, 36 L. Ed. 1011.
ISchwab v. Berggren, (1892) 143 U.S. 442, 12 S. Ct. 525, 36
L. Ed. 218.
1 Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law, (1939) 794. He cites the
state court case of Snyder v. Commonwealth, (1934) 291 U.S. 97,
54 S. Ct. 330, 78 L. Ed. 674, 90 A. L. R. 575.
'Diaz v. United States, (1912) 223 U.S. 442, 56 L.Ed. 500, 32
S. Ct. 250, Joseph R. Lamar, J., dissenting.
'Frank v. Mangum, (1914) 237 U.S. 309, 59 L. Ed. 969, 35 S. Ct.
582, 592.
74Lewis v. United States, (1892) 146 U.S. 370, 36 L.Ed. 1011,
13 S.Ct. 136.
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In a case arising in the Philippine Islands it was held that
an inspection of the scene of a homicide, made by the trial judge,
but in the absence of the accused did not infringe his right to
"meet the witnesses face to face" under an act of Congress
dealing with the Philippines. This is true where the judge in
his inspection was not improperly addressed by any one, and did
no more than visualize the testimony of the witnesses. 17 5 The
court spoke of the defendant having practically waived his
right. The two dissenting judges thought that a view was a
part of the trial.
A joint request by the prosecuting attorney and counsel
for the accused made in the chambers of the judge without the
presence of the accused, to hold the jury in deliberation until
they should agree upon a verdict does not justify communications by the court to the jury in the absence of accused and his
counsel, when the jury indicates a divergence of views with
respect to the guilt of the several defendants. 178 It is reversible
error for the trial judge to respond in writing, in the absence
of accused and his counsel, and without giving them an opportunity to be heard, to a written request by the jury for further
instructions. The joint request originally made is not to be given
an extended meaning. It is a "rule of orderly conduct of jury
trial entitling the defendant especially in a criminal case to be
present from the time the jury is impaneled until its discharge
after rendering the verdict."
A judgment of conviction of murder will be set aside if the
record does not show that the defendants were present in court
when it was entered, and were asked if they had anything to
say why sentence should not be pronounced upon them.177
Mere presence of the attorney for the accused is not enough.
There is no right to be present in the appellate court. 178 The
12rValdez v. United States, (1917) 244 U.S. 432, 61 L. Ed. 1242,
White, C. J., and Clark, J., dissenting. The dissenting judges cited
Diaz v. United States, (1912) 223 U.S. 442, 454, 56 L.Ed. 500, 505,
32 S. Ct. 250, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1138.
I" Shields v. United States, (1927) 273 U.S. 583, 71 L. Ed. 787.
See Golden, The Presence of Defendant at the Rendition of the Verdict in Felony Cases, (1916) 16 Col. L. Rev. 18; note (1941) 20 Neb.
L. Rev. 47.
17 Ball v. United States, (1891) 140 U.S. 118, 35 L.Ed. 377,
11 S. Ct. 761, 765.
'Dowell v. United States, (1911) 221 U.S. 325, 55 L.Ed. 753,
31 Sup. Ct. 590.
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objection that the accused was not present during the prosecu1
tion cannot be first urged after trial and a decision on appeal. 7
WAIVER OF JuRY TRiAL

An act of Congress of July 23, 1892,180 with respect to the
District of Columbia, allowed the accused in open court to expressly waive trial by jury and request trial by the court. In a
habeas corpus case the Supreme Court refused to find the act
unconstitutional.' 8 '
The right to trial by jury granted under Article 3, Section 2, clause 3 and the Sixth Amendment, does not include
petty offenses. This has been applied to a prosecution by information under a statute imposing a penalty of $50 for the sale
of oleomargarine which has not been branded or stamped according to law.' 8 2 Misdemeanors punishable by small fine or
short imprisonment are not crimes within the meaning of these
constitutional safeguards. A jury trial might be waived as to
petty offenses.
In 1930 it was held that a defendant in a felony case may
waive his right to a trial by jury altogether or may consent to
a trial by a jury of less than twelve.' 8 3 Possibly he could also
waive the requirement of a unanimous verdict.' 8 4 For the
waiver to be effective the consent of government counsel and
the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express
'Gaines v. Washington, (1928) 277 U.S. 81, 72 L.Ed. 793, 48
Sup. Ct.
27468.
Stat. at Large 261.
1

Ex parte Belt, (1895) 159 U. S. 95, 40 L. Ed. 88, 15 S. Ct. 987.
For the history of the federal decisions see J. A. C. Grant, Waiver of
Jury Trial in Felony Cases, (1932) 20 Calif. L. Rev. 132, 147-156.
"Schick v. United States, (1904) 195 U.S. 65, 49 L. Ed. 99, 24

S. Ct. 826, Harlan, J., dissenting. See Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclo-

pedia of FederalProcedure, (1929), vol. 5, sec. 2307; Hughes, Federal
Procedure, (1929). Vol. 5, sec. 2307; Hughes, Federal Practice,vol. 9
(1931), sec. 7077; Oppenheim, Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases,
(1927) 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695.
Patton v. United States, (1930) 281 U.S. 276, 74 L. Ed. 854,
50 S. Ct. 253, 70 A. L. R. 263, noted 30 Col. L. Rev. 1063, 18 Geo. L. J.
374, 390, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 124, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 339, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 1054,
15 Minn. L. Rev. 109, 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 144, 40 Yale L. J. 1303. The
case came up on certificate from the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, J. J., concurred in the result. See
also J. A. C. Grant, Waiver of Jury Trial in Felony Cases, (1932)
20 Calif. L. Rev. 132; E. N. Griswold, Development of Waiver of Jury
Trial in Civil Cases, (1934) 20 Va. L. Rev. 655.
10 Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law, (1939) 789. See also
Rule 48 of the Federal Civil Rules of Procedure; Brewster on Federal
Procedure, (1940) 398.
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and intelligent consent of the defendant. The court should exercise its discretion cautiously particularly as to grave offenses.
The constitution does not make a jury jurisdictional, and Congress has conferred jurisdiction on the courts to act without a
jury in case of waiver.
TRIAL JURY:

RIGHT OF, EXA

INATION, CHALLENGES, OATH

Chapter Eleven of Title 28 of the United States Code entitled "Juries" contains four classes of provisions: (1) provisions applicable to grand jurors and to petit jurors in both
civil and criminal cases;185 (2) provisions applicable only to
grand juries;186 (3) provisions applicable only to petit jurors
in civil and criminal cases;187 and (4) provisions applicable
only to petit juries in criminal cases.' 88

This chapter is con-

cerned primarily with the fourth class.' 8 9
Article III, section 2, paragraph 3 of the Constitution provides that "the trial of all crimes, except in case of impeachment, shall be by jury". The Sixth Amendment provides that
"the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury".
The trial by jury provisions of the federal constitution do
not apply to an incorporated federal territory, such as the
Philippine Islands, or Hawaii. 190 The right is not deemed a
fundamental one.
Alaska has been so incorporated into the United States by
treaty and by statutes, as to render in violation of the Sixth
' 28 U. S. C. A., sections 275 (qualifications and exceptions), 276
(manner of drawing jurors), 278 (disqualification of jurors for race
or color) and 279 (summoning of jurors). For discussion see Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, (1929), sections
1375-1389.
"128 U. S. C. A., sections 282-285. See Longsdorf and Nichols,
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, (1929), vol. 5, chapter 34, sections
1947-2003.
128 U. S. C. A., sections 417 (summoning talesmen from bystanders), 423 (jurors not to serve more than once a year), 424 (peremptory challenges). See Longsdorf and Nichols, Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, (1929), sections 1375-1389.
128 U. S. C. A., sec. 414 (mode of drawing jury in Indiana),
424 (number of peremptory challenges), 425 (peremptory challenges), 426 (grounds for challenges for cause in prosecutions for
bigamy, polygamy, or unlawful cohabitation).
I For discussion see Longsdorf and Nichols, vol. 5, (1929), sections 2306-2341.
'"Dorr v. United States, (1904) 195 U.S. 138, 49 L. Ed. 128,
24 S.Ct. 808, 1 Ann. Cas. 697. Harlan, J., dissenting. See Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law, (1939) 373, 785.
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Amendment, an act of Congress providing that in trials for
misdemeanors six jurors shall constitute a legal jury. 01 Puerto
Rico need not provide a jury trial as to the misdemeanor of
libel. 192 The jury system needs citizens trained to the exercise
of the responsibilities of jurors.
One charged with having driven an automobile so as to endanger property and individuals has a constitutional right to a
jury trial. 193 The court stressed the nature of the offense as
being the test. An act malum in se, indictable, at common law,
and shocking to the general moral sense, would call for a jury
trial.
The right of trial by jury secured by Article 3, section 2,
clause 3 and by the Sixth Amendment, does not extend to prosecutions for petty offenses. The offense of engaging without a
license in the business of a dealer in secondhand personal
property is not one as to which there is a constitutional right to
trial by jury. 9 4 The fact that a statutory offense otherwise
trivial and not a crime at common law, is punishable by imprisonment which may run for ninety days or by a fine up to
$300, does not insure the right of jury trial, even though the
defendant is not entitled to an appeal as of right. Possibly,
severity of punishment alone may ultimately be held a sufficient
basis for requiring the trial of an offense by a jury. 195
The Sixth Amendment expressly requires the jury to be
an impartial one. This would probably bar any legislation
which would prevent a defendant from challenging jurors for
causes going to their fairness and infallibility, but does not
prevent Congress from excluding as grounds for challenges
causes that do not go to these matters. 196 A statute declaring
employees of the Federal government and recipients of pensions
" Rassmussen v. United States, (1905) 197 U.S. 516, 49 L.Ed.
862, 25 S. Ct. 514.

" Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, (1922) 258 U.S. 298, 66 L. Ed.
627, 42 S. Ct. 343. Holmes, J., concurred in the result.
' District of Columbia v. Colts, (1930) 282 U.S. 63, 75 L.Ed. 177,
51 S. Ct. 52, noted 31 Col. L. Rev. 325, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 465, 19 Geo.
L. J. 2334, 9 N. Car. L. Rev. 308, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 640, 65 U. S. L. Rev.
66, 40 Yale L. J. 1303. See also Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury,
(1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917.
'" District of Columbia v. Clawans, (1937) 300 U. S. 617, 57 S. Ct.
660, 81 L. Ed. 843, McReynolds and Butler, J. J., dissenting.

Such an inference is drawn from District of Columbia v. Claw-

arts in Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law, (1939) 789.
'" Rottschaefer on ConstitutionalLaw, (1939) 785.
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or gratuities from the Federal government to be eligible as jurors
in the District of Columbia does "not violate the requirement for
an impartial jury nor due process. 197 The Court stated that it
would have decided the same way even if such persons had been
ineligible at common law. It stated in dictum that legislation
making women qualified to serve as jurors would be valid though
they were not eligible at common law.198
Where the record shows a lawful and regular jury, an
accused may not impeach and contradict this statement by
showing that instead of twelve there were only eleven jurors.199
Habeas corpus will not lie. The proceedings of one district
court within its jurisdiction cannot be impeached and reexamined collaterally by habeas corpus in the district court of
another district.
In a state court case the Court held that the use of a struck
jury even in a murder case was constitutional. 20 0 Struck juries
were not unknown to the common law, though perhaps not used
in murder cases. Under the New Jersey statute the court could
select from the persons qualified to serve as jurors ninety-six
names, from which the prosecutor and defendant might each
strike twenty-four and the remainder should be put in the jury
box, out of which the jury should be drawn in the usual way.
The court pointed out that the manner of selection was one calculated to secure an impartial jury. It stated that the purpose
of criminal procedure is not to enable the accused to select
jurors, but to secure an impartial jury. The court thought it
immaterial that a reduced number of peremptory challenges was
allowed.
'United States v. Wood, (1936) 299 U.S. 123, 57 S.Ct. 177,
81 L. Ed. 78, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler, J. J., dissenting.
Noted 6 BrooklynL.Rev. 388, 35 Col.L.Rev. 796, 50 Harv.L.Rev.
692, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 608, 11 Temple L. Q. 430. The statute is that of

August 22, 1935, chap. 605, 49 Stat. at L. 682. In United States v.
Wood the court felt itself not bound by any contrary language in
Crawford v. United States, (1909) 212 U.S. 183, 29 S. Ct. 260, 53
L.Ed. 465, 15 Ann. Cas. 392, though the three dissenting judges

felt themselves bound by that case.
'"The court cited Lyman v. United States (C. C. A., 9th, 1924)

297 F. 177, 178, 179; and Hoxie v. United States, (C. C. A., 9th, 1926)
15 F. (2d) 762. See also Glasses v. United States, (1942) 62 S. Ct.
457, 462.
'Riddle v. Dyche, (1923) 262 U. S. 333, 43 S. Ct. 555, 67 L. Ed.
1009 (felony).
"Brown v. State of New Jersey, (1899) 175 U. S. 172, 20 S. Ct.
77, 44 L. Ed. 119.
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Prior to 1879 juries were under the statute, 20 1 designated
by ballot, lot, or otherwise according to the mode of forming
such juries in the several states, and the courts were authorized
to adopt rules conforming the method of designating and impaneling juries to the laws and usages of the state. By the act
of June 30, 1879,202 a new system was inaugurated. It was provided in substance that the names of not less than 300 persons
should be placed in the jury box by the clerk of the court and
a commissioner to be appointed by the court, who should be of
opposite politics from the clerk, each to place one name in the
20 3
box alternately, without reference to party affiliations.
Under the statutes 20 4 when there is no petit jury available,
the marshal or his deputy shall by court order return jurymen
from the bystanders sufficient to complete the panel. The act
200
of June 30, 1879,205 did not repeal this provision.
A venire may properly be issued after a term has begun,
and it need not recite that the jurors are summoned for the trial
of any particular case. A motion to quash such venire will not
lie.20 7 Jurors need not be summoned before the term begins.
The name of the particular person to be tried need not be inserted in the writ.
While the laws of the respective states as to qualifications
and exemptions of jurors have been made controlling in the
federal courts, 20 8 the state laws as to designations and impaneling of jurors have not been so adopted, and are not binding
on the federal courts, except as the federal courts adopt them by
standing rule or special order.20 9
Concealment or misstatement by a juror on voir dire examU. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 800.
21 Stat. at L. 43.

See 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 412.

For a recent

important case on jury selection, see Glasses v. United States, (1942)
62 Sup. Ct. 457, 471-472.
'United States v. King, (1893)

13 S.Ct. 439.

147 U.S. 676, 37 L. Ed. 328,

U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 804.
21 Stat at L. 43.
'St. Clair v. United States, (1894) 154 U.S. 134, 38 L. Ed. 936,
14 S.Ct. 1002. The court cited Lovejoy v. United States, (1888) 128
U.S. 171, 173, 32 L. Ed. 389, 9 S.Ct. 57.
Anderson v. United States, (1898) 170 U. S. 481, 42 L. Ed. 1116,
18 S.Ct. 689, 693.
U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 800; 21 Stat. at L. 43; 28 U. S. C. A., see. 411.
"'Pointer v. United States, (1894) 151 U.S. 396, 38 L. Ed. 208,
14 S.Ct. 410. The court cites United States v. Shackelford, (1856)

18 How. 588, 15 L. Ed. 495; United States v. Richardson (C. C. Maine,
1886) 28 Fed. 61, 69.
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ination is punishable as a contempt if its tendency and design
are to obstruct the processes of justice.21 ° The oath of a contemnor is no longer a bar to a prosecution for contempt. A
juror on the trial of a case which resulted in disagreement
brought about by her vote for acquittal is guilty of contempt
where on voir dire she procures her acceptance as a juror by
concealing matters which would have led to her being challenged,
and by falsely testifying that her mind was free from bias. A
talesman when accepted as a juror becomes a part or member
of the court. The privilege from disclosure of jury deliberations does not apply to a juror who has procured her acceptance by misrepresentation and concealment.
In a case coming up from the Territory of Utah it was
held that it was proper on voir dire to interrogate the jurors as
to their belief that the practice of polygamy was in obedience to
the divine will and command. 211 At common law this would
have been ground for principal challenge of jurors of the' same
faith.21 2
In a capital case where the jury is to fix the penalty, jurors
who state on their voir dire that they have conscientious scruples
about the death penalty may be challenged by the prosecution. 21 3
The prosecution may also challenge a person conscientiously believing that polygamy is rightful.2 14
It is ordinarily proper for a trial court to refuse to permit
a juror on his moir dire to be asked as to his political affiliations.2 15
The discretion of the court as to questions to be asked jurors
on voir dire examination is subject to the essential demands of
fairness. The refusal of the court to accede to a request, on the
trial of a negro charged with killing a white man, that jurors
"I Clark v. United States, (1933) 289 U.S. 1, 77 L. Ed. 993, and
note at 1003, noted 3 Idaho L. J. 359, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 292, 24 J. Crim. L.

446, 17 Marq. L. Rev. 300, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 850, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 299
and 340, 11 N. Car. L. Rev. 347, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1000, 8 Wis. L. Rev.
371.

" Miles v. United States, (1880) 103 U.S. 304, 26 L. Ed. 481.
For the statutes later enacted in 1882 see 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 426.
.123 Blackstone, Commentaries, 303.
'Logan v. United States, (1892) 144 U.S. 263, 36 L. Ed. 429,
12 S. Ct. 617, 628.
... Reynolds v. United States, (1879) 98 U.S. 145, 147, 157,
25 L. Ed. 244. Miles v. United States, (1880) 103 U.S. 304, 310,
26 L. Ed. 481.
1 Connors v. United States, (1895) 158 U. S. 408, 39 L. Ed. 1033,
15 S. Ct. 951.

L. J.-5
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be interrogated as to racial prejudice, is reversible error. 216
Motions as to racial or religious prejudice resulting in bias should
2 17
be allowed.
In a case coming up from the Territory of Oklahoma it was
held that the right of the accused to object that a juror was
disqualified because it appeared during the trial that he had
been convicted of a felony, contrary to his statement on his voir
dire, is waived by failure to raise the question until after the
verdict. 218 He must object at the time. This is particularly true
when the court asked the counsel for the accused what they
desired to do, and intimated that if the objection were pressed
the juror would be excused, which meant that the trial would
have to begin all over again, and counsel replied that they had
nothing to say.
In a case coming up from the District of Columbia the
Court ruled 219 that the objection that the petit jury was not
lawfully drawn should be taken at the trial, and not first raised
on review in the Superior Court, particularly since the District
of Columbia Code220 provides that no verdict shall be set aside
for any cause which might be alleged as ground of challenge
before a jury is sworn, except for disqualifying bias not then
discovered or suspected.
There is no violation of the Sixth Amendment where the
jurors are not drawn from the entire district, but one division
thereof. 22' This is shown by the contemporary construction
placed on the Amendment by the Judiciary Act of 1789,222 expressly authorizing the drawing of the jury from a part of the
district, and the continuous legislative and judicial practice from
223
the beginning.
1 Aldridge v. United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 308, 75 L. Ed. 1054.

The court stated that in "accordance with the existing practice, the
questions to the prospective jurors were just by the court."
2

But the court agreed with an earlier one that bias arising out

of political affiliations was too remote. See Connors v. United States,

(1895) 158 U. S. 408, 15 S. Ct. 951, 39 L. Ed. 1033.
1Queenan v. Territory of Oklahoma, (1903) 190 U.S. 548, 47
L. Ed. 1175, 23 S. Ct. 762.
'Johnson v. United States, (1912) 225 U.S. 405, 56 L. Ed. 1142,
32 S. Ct. 748, 753.
31 Stat. at L. 1338, chap. 854.

' Ruthenberg v. United States, (1918) 245 U.S. 480, 62 L. Ed.
414, 38 S.Ct. 168.
1 Stat. at L. 73, chap. 50.
'Agnew v. United States, (1897) 165 U.S. 36, 43, 41 L. Ed. 624,
21

627, 17 S. Ct. 235.
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The Sixth Amendment does not require that the grand and
the petit jury be drawn from the entire district. 224 Congress
has provided that "jurors shall be returned from such part of
the district, from time to time, as the court shall direct, so as
to be most favorable to an impartial trial, and was not to incur
an unnecessary expense, or unduly burden the citizens of any
part of the district with such service."122 5 Whether or not the
directions of the court should be in writing is not clear.
Possibly state rules are to be applied as to the matter of
challenges for cause. There is no clear holding that they must
be.

22 6

In a case coming up from the Territory of Utah it was held
that when a challenge by the accused to a juror for bias, actual
or implied, is disallowed, and the juror is then peremptorily
challenged by the accused and examined, and an impartial juror
is obtained in his place, no injury is done to the accused, if,
until the jury is completed, he has other peremptory challenge
22 7
which he may use.

The refusal of the trial court to sustain a challenge for
cause will not be disturbed on appeal, where it appears from
the examination of such juror that he had not talked with anyone purported to know about the case of his own knowledge,
that he had no opinion other than that derived from the newspapers, and that evidence would change it very easily, and he
thought he could try the case solely on the evidence. 228 The
finding of the trial court should not be upset unless the *error
is manifest. It is not clear that the state court decisions on this
question bind the federal trial court.
An erroneous ruling in a homicide case upon the defendant's challenge, of a juror for cause could not prejudice the
accused where such juror was peremptorily challenged by the
accused, and the accused was in fact allowed one or two more
than the statutory number of peremptory challenges, and there
is nothing in the record to show that any juror who sat upon
'

Lewis v. United States, (1929) 279 U.S. 63, 73 L. Ed. 615. The

court cited Ruthenberg v. United States, (1918) 245 U.S. 480, 482,

62 L. Ed. 414, 418, 38 S. Ct. 168.
2 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 413, 277 of the Judicial Code.
I Holt v. United States, (1910) 218 U.S. 245, 54 L. Ed. 1021,
31 S. Ct. 2, 4.
'" Hopt v. People, (1887) 120 U.S. 430, 30 L. Ed. 708, 7 S. Ct. 614.
'Holt v. United States, (1910) 218 U.S. 245, 54 L. Ed. 1021,
31 S. Ct. 2, 4.
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the trial was in fact objectionable.2 29 The statute in such a case
230
allows the accused twenty peremptory challenges.
Experimental approaches to the corruption of a petit juror
in the discharge of his duty, though before he was elected or
sworn are, irrespective of failure or success, within the provisions of Section 135 of the Criminal Code, 231 for the punishment of anyone who corruptly, or by threats of force, or by any
threatening letter, shall endeavor to influence, intimidate, or im232
pede any petit juror in the discharge of his duty.
In 1790 Congress provided for granting certain peremptory
challenges to the defendant, 233 but no peremptory challenge was
234
allowed to the prosecution.
The Crimes Act of 1790235 provided for the right of peremptory challenge in capital cases. Mr. Justice Story asserted
in 1827 as to joint trials that "this right, to the extent of the
statute, must, in all cases, be allowed the prisoners, whether they
be tried jointly or separately. "236
The Act of Congress of July 20, 1840,237 was construed
as giving the courts of the United States the power to make all
necessary rules and regulations for conforming the impaneling
of juries to the laws and usages in force in the state.238 This
power included that of regulating the challenges of jurors,
whether peremptory or for cause, except as to treason and other
capital crimes. The act of 1790239 recognized the right of per'Stroud v. United States, (1919) 251 U.S. 15, 64 L. Ed. 103,
40 S. Ct. 50; rehearing denied (1920) 251 U.S. 380, 64 L.Ed. 317;
The court cites Holt v. United States, (1910) 218 U.S. 245, 248,
54 L. Ed. 1021, 1028, 31 S. Ct. 2, 20, Ann. Cas. 1138; Hopt v. Utah,
(1887) 120 U.S. 430, 30 L. Ed. 708, 7 S. Ct. 614; Hayes v. Missouri,
(1887) 120 U.S. 68, 71, 30 L. Ed. 578, 580, 7 S. Ct. 350; Spies v. Illinois, (1887) 123 U.S. 131, 31 L. Ed. 80, 8 S. Ct. 21, 22.
='Jud. Code, sec. 287, 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 424.
35 Stat. at L. 1113, chap. 321, Comp. Stat., sec. 10, 305; 18
U.S. C.A., sec. 241.
'United States v. Russell, (1921) 255 U.S. 138, 65 L.Ed. 553,
41 S. Ct. 260.
' 1 Stat. at L. 119, chap. 9.
"Sawyer v. United States, (1906) 202 U.S. 150, 50 L. Ed. 972,
26 S. Ct. 575, 577.
'Chap. 9, sec. 29.
' United States v. Merchant and Colson, (1827) 12 Wheat.
(25 U.S.) 480, 6 L. Ed. 700.
2" 5 Stat. at L. 394.
'38

United States v. Shackelford, (1855) 18 Harv. (59 U.S.) 588,

15 L. Ed. 495.
" 1 Stat. at L. 119. This act gave the accused thirty-five challenges in treason cases and twenty in felony, which was the corn-

FDERAL CRIxrNAL PROCEDURE

emptory challenge in these cases, and therefore it could not be
taken away from the courts. However, that recognition did
not necessarily draw along with it the qualified right, existing
at common law, of challenge by the prosecution. Therefore,
unless the laws of the state, adopted by rule of court, allow it
on behalf of the prosecution, it should be rejected, conforming
to the state practice.
There being no act of Congress on the subject of the manner of impaneling and challenging jurors, the trial court can
lay down its own rules..2 40 It may follow the state practice, but
it is not bound to do so. Mr. Justice Shiras has stated that
"all rules of practice must necessarily be adopted to secure the
rights of the accused; that is, when there is no statute, the practice must not conflict with or abridge the right as it exists at
241
common law.
On a murder trial the action of the court in compelling defendant to make his peremptory challenges of jurors in ignorance
of the challenges made by the government, whereby he challenged two jurors who had also been challenged by the district
attorney, is not ground for reversal, where defendant failed
to except at the time, and did not object until after conviction,
2 42
on motion for a new trial.
In the absence of a rule of court or a special order adopting the state law and practice to the contrary, the rights of the
defendant are not infringed by requiring him to exercise his
peremptory challenges from a list of qualified jurors not subject
to challenge for cause, without having the peremptory challenges
made by the government, although this may result in both parties challenging the same person.24 3 The government need not
exercise its challenge first. The order of challenge is in the discretion of the trial court.
A local circuit court rule that a juror shall be challenged
or accepted and sworn as soon as his examination is completed
mon law rule. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, 354, 355; United States
v. Marchant and Colson, (1827) 12 Wheat 480, 483, 6 L. Ed. 700, 701.
"Lewis v. United States, (1892) 146 U.S. 370, 36 L. Ed. 1011,
13 S. Ct. 136, 138.
"'Lewis v. United States, (1892) 146 U.S. 370, 36 L. Ed. 1011,
13 S.Ct. 136, 139.
1' Alexander v. United States, (1891) 138 U. S. 353, 34 L. Ed. 954,
11 S. Ct. 350.
'Pointer v. United States, (1894) 151 U.S. 396, 38 L. Ed. 208,
14 S.Ct. 410. The court followed Lewis v. United States, (1892)
146 U.S. 370, 36 L.Ed. 1011, 13 S.Ct. 136.
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is not objectionable as embarrassing the exercise of the right of
244
peremptory challenge.
The conditional or qualified right of challenge on behalf
of the prosecution, which has the effect of setting aside a juror
until the panel is exhausted, without assigning any cause, still
existed in 1906, in those states where such practice obtained,
despite the Act of March 3, 1865,245 and June 8, 1872,246 giving
peremptory challenges to the prosecution, if such practice had
conformably to the Act of July 20, 1840,247 been adopted by a
court rule in the Federal courts. 248 The prosecution has not
exercised such right of challenge unreasonably where neither
the prosecution nor the defendants had exhausted all their peremptory challenges when the jury was obtained.
In a capital case the accused has the right to be confronted
with the panel of jurors, and to be present at the challenges. 24 9
It is therefore reversible error for a federal judge to direct
secret challenges to be made from separate jury lists, each side
being ignorant of the challenges the other has made. .
The offense of reselling smuggled goods 2 0 was held in 1895
not a felony, so as to entitle the accused to ten peremptory challenges, although he is liable to be punished by fine and two years'
imprisonment which may be inflicted in a state penitentiary,
since the offense is subordinate to smuggling which is expressly
declared by statute to be a misdemeanor, though the penalty is
substantially the same. 251 Today, the statutes provide that "all
" St. Clair v. United States, (1894) 154 U. S. 134, 38 L. Ed. 936,

1002.
14 S.24Ct.
13 Stat. at L. 500, chap. 86.
21117 Stat. at L. 282, chap. 333.
"4 5 Stat. at L. 394, chap. 47, U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 800, U. S. Comp.
Stat. 1901, p. 623.
'Sawyer v. United States, (1906) 202 U.S. 150, 50 L. Ed. 972,
26 S.Ct. 575. The court pointed out that the origin of the practice
was stated by Field, J., in Hayes v. Missouri, (1887) 120 U.S. 68-71,
30 L. Ed. 578-580, 7 S.Ct. 350, 351.
The court also cited a dictum by Story, J., in United States v.
Marchant, (1827) 12 Wheat. 480, 6 L. Ed. 700.
S'Lewis v. United States, (1892) 146 U.S. 370, 36 L. Ed. 1011,
13 S.Ct. 136, Brewer and Brown, J. J., dissenting on the ground that
the inference of fact on which the decision is based were not justified by the record.
'5*U. S. Rev. Stat., sec. 3082.

Reagan v. United States, (1895) 157 U.S. 301, 39 L. Ed. 709,
15 S.Ct. 610. The court cited Bannon v. United States, (1875) 156
U. S. 464, 39 L. Ed. 494, 15 S.Ct. 467 to the effect that the term felony
is used to designate such offenses as were formerly punishable by
death or forfeiture of the lands or goods of the offender.

FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

offenses which may be punishable by death or imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year" are felonies and that "all other
offenses shall be misdemeanors.' '252
In a case involving a felony, such as robbing the mails,
under the federal statute258 the defendant is entitled to ten

peremptory challenges. Hence when he is allowed only three as
for a misdemeanor, the verdict may be set aside and he is entitled
to a new trial.

25 4

The constitutional rights of several defendants tried jointly
are not infringed by the requirement of a federal statute that,
in cases where there are several defendants, they shall be treated
as a single party for the purpose of peremptory challenges. 2 5
There is nothing in the Constitution requiring Congress to grant
peremptory challenges in criminal cases, and the privileges
granted must be taken with the limitations placed upon its exercise. Treating the several parties as one has been the law as
far back as 1865.
Congress may reduce the number of peremptory challenges
of the accused. 2 56 At common law he had thirty-five, the statute of 22 Henry VIII, chap. 14, fixed it at twenty, and Congress
has reduced to ten in the cases of felonies other than treason
257
or capital offenses.
Peremptory challenges to trial jurors are regulated by statute, which gives in capital cases the defendant twenty and the
United States six such challenges; in other felonies the defendant has ten and the United States six; in all other cases, civil
and criminal, each party has three. 258 And several defendants
are treated as a single party for the purpose of challenges under
this statute.
'

18 U. S. C. A., sec. 541, Penal Code 335.

U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 816.
'Harrison v. United States, (1896) 163 U.S. 140, 41 L. Ed. 104,
16 S.Ct. 961.

' Schaeffer v. United States, (1920) 251 U.S. 466, 64 L. Ed. 360;
Stilson v. United States, (1919) 250 U.S. 583, 63 L. Ed. 1154, 40

S. Ct. 28.

Compare language in Lewis v. United States, (1892) 146 U.S.
370, 36 L. Ed. 1011, 13 S.Ct. 136.
1 United States v. Wood, (1936) 299 U.S. 123, 57 S.Ct. 177,
81 L. Ed. 78; Rottschaefer on Constitutional Law, (1939) 786. The
court cited Stilson v. United States, (1919) 25 A. U.S. 583, 586,
40 S.Ct. 28, 63 L. Ed. 1154, 1156
17 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 424.
"Jud. Code., sec. 287, 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 424. See Dobie on
Federal Procedure, (1929) 109.
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Where objection is taken that the petit jury were not sworn,
such objection will not avail where the record discloses, on appeal, that the jurors were "called and impaneled" and "being
selected and tried in the manner prescribed by law, the truth
of and upon the premises to speak, and having heard the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and the charge of the judge,
retired to consider their verdict, and upon their oaths to
say.' '259 The federal statutes today provide for the use of al2 60
ternate jurors.

I Power v. United States, (1912) 223 U.S. 303, 56 L. Ed. 448,
32 S. Ct. 281.
'" 28 U. S. C. A., sec. 417a.
For the provision in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, see Rule 47(b). As to the constitutionality of
alternate juror statutes, see 15 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 218, 9 U. Cin. L. Rev.
307, 16 Iowa L. Rev. 232, 85 U. Pa. L. Rev. 539, 4 So. Calif. L. Rev. 203,
70 A. L. R. 182, 71 A. L. R. 1385, 96 A. L. R. 793, 102 A. L. R. 1055,
109 A. L. R. 1488.
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